Labor Logic

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John D. Finerty, Jr.

The general rule on summary judgment is that district courts may not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses at the summary judgment stage. This is a “general” rule because there are exceptions. One exception, applied in the recent case of Jeffreys v. City of New York, Case No. 03-0257 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2005), allowed a district court to dismiss a claim that was based only on the plaintiff’s testimony, unsubstantiated by other direct evidence, that was “so replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities” that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.

Background

Percy Jeffreys was arrested in the early morning hours of Feb. 10, 1998 for attempting to burglarize a public school in the Bronx, New York. A New York City police officer who worked at the school noticed Jeffreys in a school courtyard and called for backup. Two officers began searching the school and heard glass breaking, presumably when Jeffreys shattered a door window and reached inside to unlock the door and enter a classroom. At that point two versions of what occurred next emerged in discovery.

According to Jeffreys, he heard someone approaching the classroom so he hid under a desk. He next remembers that “someone” entered the classroom, shined a light in his face and identified himself as a police officer. The officer then struck him several times in the head, body and arms with a flashlight. He was later surrounded by more police but lost consciousness as the beatings continued. He awoke with searing pain in his leg on the pavement directly below an open window, three stories below the classroom.

According to the officers, when they found the burglarized classroom, they shined a flashlight through a broken window in the classroom door and discovered Jeffreys looting school property. They commanded him not to move, but Jeffreys dropped the stolen items and attempted to escape out an open window onto what the officers assumed was an outside stairway, but he fell without any contact from the officers.

Conflicting Evidence

Jeffreys sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court evaluated evidence from both sides and concluded that “permitting Jeffreys to present such incredulous testimony at trial would be a waste of judicial resources and a fraud on the court.”

The district court based its conclusions on the following:

dOn at least 3 occasions, Jeffreys confessed to having jumped out the third story window of the school building. First, he told medical personnel on the day of the incident that he had “jumped 3 stories” and that “he hurt himself.” Also, two days after the incident, Jeffreys told a police sergeant during an interview that “he attempted to flee out of the classroom window, lost his footing and fell to the concrete below, injuring his right leg.” Last, Jeffreys signed a written confession to 12 burglaries, but the confession made no reference to any police mistreatment; at his arraignment, guilty plea and sentencing hearing, Jeffreys also made no mention of any beating.

dEmergency medical personnel who examined Jeffreys found no evidence of any head trauma.

dMedical professionals conducted a CAT scan and concluded that there was no indication that Jeffreys had “suffered a blow to the head with a hard round object such as a flashlight.”

To contradict this evidence, Jeffreys offered the statement of his aunt as evidence that he called her from jail shortly after his arrest and told her that he had been thrown out a window by police. He offered the statement of a second woman, the mother of his child, to establish that sometime in 1999 or 2000, Jeffreys told her of both the attack and having been thrown out the window.

The district court held that Jeffreys’ suit for excessive force raised no genuine issue of material fact because it relied “exclusively on affidavits of family members and friends, his own testimony, and inferences drawn from medical records, a report and the officers’ testimony” that was “so replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities that a reasonable jury could not find that excessive force was used against him.”

Analysis

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) is the often cited Supreme Court case on the requirements for obtaining summary judgment under Federal Rule 56(c). The Second Circuit in Jeffreys seized on a particular portion of Anderson that opened the door and allow the district court to evaluate the credibility of evidence presented by a plaintiff: “The judge must ask … not whether … the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” The court went onto note the often cited phrase, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not enough for a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment.

With those standards as background, the court noted the potential factual issues were whether Jeffreys jumped, fell or was thrown by police out the window; whether he was struck in the head with a flashlight; and, whether he was otherwise physically assaulted by police. The court of appeals concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact, even after drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to Jeffreys, and no reasonable jury could issue a verdict in his favor.

The absence of corroborating evidence and inconsistencies and contradictions in Jeffreys’ sworn testimony, confessions and other statements doomed his case. On one hand, he told medical personnel that he had jumped out the school window, but he claims to also have told his aunt and girlfriend (one or two years later) that he was pushed. Nothing, therefore, supported Jeffreys’ allegations, other than his own contradictory and incomplete testimony.

Further, t
he medical evidence was that Jeffreys was not struck in the head — leading to only one conclusion, according to the court: that police had not assaulted him.

The court thus held that the plaintiff’s claim would be dismissed because it was based on Jeffreys’ testimony — which was largely unsubstantiated by any other direct evidence — and was “so replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities” that no reasonable juror could undertake the suspension of disbelief necessary to credit the allegations made in his complaint.

For more information on this case, contact John D. Finerty, Jr. at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP at (414) 225-8269 or on the Internet at [email protected].