02-2981 Perruquet v. Briley

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“[T]he procedural default in this case is clear: Perruquet failed to raise his due process claim at any level of state-court review. Second, because no Illinois court was ever given the opportunity to pass on the merits of Perruquet’s constitutional claim, comity and federalism principles weigh strongly against permitting Perruquet to assert the claim in federal court. Third, if we were to reach the merits of Perruquet’s constitutional claim, we necessarily would have to do so de novo, as there is no state-court decision we can look to for an evaluation of this claim. See Newell v. Hanks, supra, 335 F.3d at 631-32; Aleman v. Sternes, supra, 320 F.3d at 690. This would be inconsistent with the high level of deference to state-court decisions that Congress mandated when it passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See, e.g., McFowler v. Jaimet, 349 F.3d 436, 455 (7th Cir. 2003). It would also amount to a windfall for Perruquet, who would win plenary review of a claim that he never presented to the Illinois courts, whereas habeas petitioners who properly present their claims to state courts first are entitled only to the extremely narrow review mandated by section 2254(d). Fourth and finally, Perruquet’s claim would call upon us to reconcile a State’s prerogative to define the elements of crimes and affirmative defenses, see Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1995) (en banc), with a defendant’s right to present a complete defense to the charges against him, see California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at 485, 104 S. Ct. at 2532; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1045 (1973); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2023 (1996) (plurality) (acknowledging possibility that right to have jury consider evidence of self-defense may be fundamental right). See, e.g., Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether Michigan law vis-à-vis self-defense deprived defendant of due process). For example, Perruquet represents that he cannot, in good faith, admit that he stabbed Hudson because he does not recall doing so. Perruquet does not believe that Illinois law insists on such an admission, so long as he acknowledges the sequence of events (i.e., the struggle with Hudson) that culminated in Hudson’s death and he admits using force that he believed was necessary to defend himself from Hudson (i.e., he lunged at Hudson and knocked him to the ground upon feeling a sting in his side, thinking that Hudson had stabbed him). Perruquet Reply Br. at 9 (citing People v. Robinson, 516 N.E.2d 1292, 1304-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (evidence of self-defense admissible as to struggle that ended with fatal gunshot, even if defendant claims that gunshot itself was an accident)). If Illinois law did demand such an admission, then by Perruquet’s account it would place him in an impossible situation, requiring him either to commit perjury by confessing an act that he does not recall or to forfeit the claim of self-defense altogether. Id. at 10 n.4. Wherever the asserted defect lies (be it in the state court’s interpretation of Illinois law or in Illinois law itself), Perruquet contends that it deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself against the charge. The Illinois courts, which have a much greater familiarity than we do with Illinois law and the requirements it imposes on claims of self-defense, are better situated in the first instance to identify those requirements and to consider whether they actually interfered with Perruquet’s right to a fundamentally fair trial; and conversely we would be at a disadvantage in making that assessment without the guidance that the state courts could offer us as to the parameters of Illinois law.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Mihm, J., Rovner, J.