01-3063-CR State v. Picotte

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“The circuit court ruled that while the year-and-a-day rule may have been the law in Wisconsin, the legislature abrogated the common-law rule when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2). We agree with both the State and the defendant that the circuit court’s ruling is erroneous. Section 939.74(2) eliminates any statute of limitations for a prosecution for first-degree reckless homicide. It provides that a prosecution under § 940.02 ‘may be commenced at any time.’ A statute of limitations sets the time within which a prosecution must be commenced after the crime is completed. In contrast, the year-and-a-day rule is a substantive principle of criminal law defining when a murder has been committed. ‘There is no question that the year-and-a-day rule has long been recognized in the common law as substantive legal principle.’ In adopting § 939.74(2), the legislature did not act to alter or suspend the year-and-a-day rule.”

“Advances in medical science that permit causes of death to be identified with great certainty have undermined the first justification for the year-and-a-day rule. Modern rules of evidence giving jurors access to expert opinion testimony regarding the cause of death undermine the second justification for the rule. Finally, since Wisconsin does not have the death penalty, the third justification for the rule can have no sway in this state.

“In addition to the lack of any justification for continuing the year-and-a-day rule in modern society, two affirmative reasons exist for abolishing the year-and-a-day common-law rule. First, the common-law rule raises the specter of a family’s being forced to choose between terminating the use of a life-support system and allowing an accused to escape a murder charge. Second, it is unjust to permit an assailant to escape punishment because of a convergence of modern medical advances and an archaic rule from the thirteenth century.

“[W]e conclude that the year-and-a-day rule should be overruled purely prospectively. Prosecutions for murder in which the conduct inflicting the death occurs after the date of this decision are permissible regardless of whether the victim dies more than a year and a day after the infliction of the fatal injury. Although the defendant in the present case is not punished for the death of the victim and relatives and friends of the victim are not vindicated by our decision today, the defendant does not go unpunished. The defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery and substantial battery stands. His sentence of 15 years imprisonment stands. Thus, important values in our society have been preserved.”

DISSENTING OPINION: Wilcox, J. with whom Crooks and Sykes, JJ., join. “I agree with the court’s determination that the year-and-a-day rule was, until today, part of Wisconsin law. I also agree that this court has the authority to abrogate such a common law rule, and that the year-and-a-day rule is outdated and should be abrogated. However, I must disagree with the court’s conclusion in Part V of the majority opinion that the abrogation of the rule should not be applied to this defendant. While I do not dispute the majority’s assertion that this court may decide whether or not the ‘new rule’ should be applied prospectively or retroactively, I take issue with the court’s apparent disregard for a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court on this exact issue. In Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), the Court held that retroactive application of abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule was permissible. This court has typically followed the interpretations of the Supreme Court on issues of due process. Because I see no reason why the court should not adopt the Rogers analysis and because I find it fair to apply the abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule to this defendant, I respectfully dissent.”

DISSENTING OPINION: Sykes, J., with whom Wilcox and Crooks, JJ., join. “The majority notes that ‘[the] most common reason for prospective overruling is to protect the reliance interests of individuals and institutions that have ordered their affairs’ in accordance with the prior legal rule. Majority op., ¶45. It cannot seriously be suggested that persons who commit violent, ultimately fatal assaults ‘order their affairs’ around the year-and-a-day rule. The rule does not implicate any institutional reliance interests.”

Court of Appeals, Abrahamson, C.J.

Attorneys:

For Appellant: John T. Wasielewski, Milwaukee

For Respondent: David J. Becker, James E. Doyle, Madison