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01-1500 Clay v. U.S.

By: dmc-admin//March 10, 2003//

01-1500 Clay v. U.S.

By: dmc-admin//March 10, 2003//

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Supporting the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, the Court’s invited amicus curiae urges a different determinant, relying on verbal differences between sec. 2255 and sec. 2244(d)(1), which governs petitions for federal habeas corpus by state prisoners. Where sec. 2255, ¶6(1), refers simply to “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final,” sec. 2244(d)(1)(A) speaks of “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” When “Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23. Invoking the maxim recited in Russello, amicus asserts that “becomes final” in sec. 2255, ¶6(1), cannot mean the same thing as “became final” in sec. 2244(d)(1)(A); reading the two as synonymous, amicus maintains, would render superfluous the words “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”-words found only in the latter provision. If sec. 2255, ¶6(1), explicitly incorporated the first of sec. 2244(d)(1)(A)’s finality formulations, one might indeed question the soundness of interpreting sec. 2255 implicitly to incorporate sec. 2244(d)(1)(A)’s second trigger as well. As written, however, sec. 2255 leaves “becomes final” undefined. Russello hardly warrants a decision that would hold the sec. 2255 petitioner to a tighter time constraint than the petitioner governed by sec. 2244(d)(1)(A). An unqualified term, Russello indicates, calls for a reading surely no less broad than a pinpointed one. Moreover, one can readily comprehend why Congress might have found it appropriate to spell out the meaning of “final” in sec. 2244(d)(1)(A) but not in sec. 2255. Section sec. 2244(d)(1) governs petitions by state prisoners. In that context, a bare reference to “became final” might have suggested that finality assessments should be made by reference to state law rules. Those rules may differ from the general federal rule and vary from State to State. The qualifying words in sec.2244(d)(1)(A) make it clear that finality is to be determined by reference to a uniform federal rule. Section 2255, however, governs only petitions by federal prisoners; within the federal system there is no comparable risk of varying rules to guard against.”

30 Fed. Appx. 607, reversed and remanded.

Local effect:

The decision reverses current law in the Seventh Circuit, Gendron v. U.S., 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1998).

Ginsburg, J.

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