01-1231 Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, et al. v. Doe

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Due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme. Mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693. But even assuming, arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact – that he is not currently dangerous – that is not material under the statute. Cf., e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433. As the DPS Website explains, the law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone-a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest. Unless respondent can show that the substantive rule of law is defective (by conflicting with the Constitution), any hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise. Respondent expressly disavows any reliance on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, and maintains that his challenge is strictly a procedural one. But States are not barred by principles of “procedural due process” from drawing such classifications. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (plurality opinion). Such claims “must ultimately be analyzed” in terms of substantive due process. Id., at 121. Because the question is not properly before the Court, it expresses no opinion as to whether the State’s law violates substantive due process principles.”

271 F.3d 38, reversed.

Local effect:

Neither Wisconsin courts nor the Seventh Circuit have considered the issue.

Rehnquist, C. J.; Scalia, J., concurring; Souter, J., concurring; Stevens, J., concurring.