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01-1184 U.S. v. Recio

By: dmc-admin//January 27, 2003//

01-1184 U.S. v. Recio

By: dmc-admin//January 27, 2003//

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The Ninth Circuit is incorrect in its view that a conspiracy ends through “defeat” when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracy’s goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. First, the Ninth Circuit’s rule is inconsistent with basic conspiracy law. The agreement to commit an unlawful act is “a distinct evil,” which “may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65. The conspiracy poses a “threat to the public” over and above the threat of the substantive crime’s commission-both because the “[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes” and because it “decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.” E.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-594. Where police have frustrated a conspiracy’s specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain, as does the conspiracy’s essence-the agreement to commit the crime. Second, this Court’s view is that of almost all courts and commentators but for the Ninth Circuit. No other Federal Court of Appeals has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rule, and three have explicitly rejected it. The Cruz majority argued that the traditional rule threatened “endless” potential liability. But the majority’s example illustrating that point-a sting in which police instructed an arrested conspirator to call all of his acquaintances to come and help him, with the Government obtaining convictions of those who did so-draws its persuasive force from the fact that it bears certain resemblances to entrapment, which the law independently forbids. At the same time, the Cruz rule would reach well beyond arguable police misbehavior, potentially threatening the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-209. Ninth Circuit precedent, whereby the language “the defendant … defeated its purpose” in United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1236, was changed to “a conspiracy is presumed to continue until there is … defeat of the [conspiracy’s purpose]” in United States v. Bloch, 696 F.2d 1213, 1215 (emphasis added), may help to explain the Cruz rule’s origin. But, since the Ninth Circuit’s earlier cases nowhere give any reason for the critical language change, they cannot help to justify it.

Reversed and remanded.

Local effect:

The decision is consistent with governing law in the Seventh Circuit, U.S. v. Labudda, 882 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1989).

Breyer, J.; Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

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