01-706 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine

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“The FBSA does not expressly pre-empt petitioner’s common-law tort claims. Section 10’s express pre-emption clause – which applies to ‘a [state or local] law or regulation’ – is most naturally read as not encompassing common-law claims for two reasons. First, the article ‘a’ implies a discreteness that is not present in common law. Second, because ‘a word is known by the company it keeps,’ Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1, the terms ‘law’ and ‘regulation’ used together indicate that Congress only pre-empted positive enactments. The Act’s saving clause buttresses this conclusion. It assumes that there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to save, and sec. 10’s language permits a narrow reading excluding common-law actions. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914. And the contrast between its general reference to ‘liability at common law’ and sec. 10’s more specific and detailed description of what is pre-empted – including an exception for state regulations addressing ‘uniquely hazardous conditions’ – indicates that sec. 10 was drafted to pre-empt performance standards and equipment requirements imposed by statute or regulation. This interpretation does not produce anomalous results. It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which necessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating accident victims.”

Reversed and remanded.

Local effect:

The decision is consistent with Wisconsin case law, Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 146 Wis.2d 604, 432 N.W.2d 130 (Ct.App.1988).

On Certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court, Stevens, J.