01-4225 Williams v. Davis

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“Before trial in this case, trial counsel were furnished with a serologist report indicating that blood had been found on Williams’ shorts. However, trial counsel did not become aware of that fact until the middle of trial, a fact that undermined their entire defense strategy. Their strategy, as indicated earlier, was based on the assumption that no blood was found on Williams’ clothing. Consequently, at trial, trial counsel did not cross-examine Epperson about the blood on Williams’ shorts, did not cross-examine Lach about the fact that he did not see any blood on Williams’ shorts on the night that Williams was arrested, and did not present expert testimony about how the blood may have gotten onto Williams’ shorts. We agree with both parties that trial counsel’s performance in this aspect of the case was deficient.

“We hold that the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland for two reasons. First, the trial judge and jury were well-informed of the fact that the blood found on Williams’ shorts could have come from somewhere other than the crime scene. For example, Epperson testified that the blood was consistent with the blood of 45% of the population, and thus her testimony showed that there were millions of potential sources of the blood other than the Reases or Williams. Indeed, Williams’ counsel seized on this point during closing arguments to note that the blood found on Williams’ shorts could have come from ‘millions of people.’ Further, Williams’ counsel also stated during closing arguments that the State did not present a ‘splatter’ expert, and therefore, the State failed to show that the blood came from the crime scene. Finally, Lach conceded at trial that he observed Williams’ clothing on the night that he was arrested, but did not see any blood on it, thus creating a potential inference that the blood got onto Williams’ shorts sometime after Lach observed them but before his clothing was confiscated three days later. Therefore, we agree with the Indiana Supreme Court that the facts about which Williams argues competent counsel would have presented at trial were in fact known by the jury.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Sharp, J., Kanne, J.