01-3000 U.S. v. Knox

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“Knox concedes that the evidence of his bad acts ‘may satisfy the first three parts’ of the Rule 404(b) test. Knox instead contends that the cumulative prejudice from the admission of nine other drug transactions overwhelmed the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. He further argues that the admission of the audiotape of the December 1998 controlled buy overwhelmed the instructions because two other witnesses had already testified to that controlled buy. We presume, however, that the jury followed the district court’s instructions to consider the Rule 404(b) evidence only for the purpose of evaluating Knox’s knowledge that he possessed crack and his intent to distribute, not for his propensity to commit the crimes charged. See United States v. Miller, 276 F.3d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Scop, 940 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1991). Moreover, ‘intent to distribute drugs and knowledge that a particular substance is a narcotic often are proven through testimony about prior sales of controlled substances.’ United States v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 283 (2001); see also United States v. Denberg, 212 F.3d 987, 993-94 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). And the government must prove a defendant’s intent to distribute even when that defendant does not claim to have acted with innocent intentions. Jones, 248 F.3d at 675; United States v. Brown, 34 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, we find no abuse of discretion or plain error because the trial judge was in a better position to analyze the cumulative effect of the Rule 404(b) evidence and to determine whether that evidence was needed to prove knowledge and intent.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Gilbert, J., Rovner, J.