01-521 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

Listen to this article

Under any definition of “impartiality,” the announce clause fails strict scrutiny. First, it is plain that the clause is not narrowly tailored to serve impartiality (or its appearance) in the traditional sense of the word, i.e., as a lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding. Indeed, the clause is barely tailored to serve that interest at all, inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues. Second, although “impartiality” in the sense of a lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view may well be an interest served by the announce clause, pursuing this objective is not a compelling state interest, since it is virtually impossible, and hardly desirable, to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law, see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835. Third, the Court need not decide whether achieving “impartiality” (or its appearance) in the sense of openmindedness is a compelling state interest because, as a means of pursuing this interest, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive that the Court does not believe it was adopted for that purpose. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52ù53. Respondents have not carried the burden imposed by strict scrutiny of establishing that statements made during an election campaign are uniquely destructive of openmindedness.

247 F.3d 854, reversed and remanded.

Local effect:

The decision partially overrules Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993), approving a similar provision, and likely renders similar Wisconsin canons unconstitutional.

Scalia, J.; O’Connor, J., concurring; Kennedy, J., concurring; Stevens, J., dissenting; Ginsburg, J., dissenting.