01-1969, 01-1970 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

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“When it passed sections 2339A and 2339B, Congress undoubtedly intended that the persons providing financial support to terrorists should also be held criminally liable for those violent acts. Indeed, as we have already noted, the Congressional record for section 2333 indicates an intention to cut off the flow of money in support of terrorism generally. S. Rep. 102-342 at 22 (1992). Sections 2339A and 2339B further this goal by imposing criminal liability for financial support of terrorist activities and organizations. The fact that Congress imposed lesser criminal penalties for the financial supporters indicates perhaps that they found the financiers less dangerous or less culpable than the terrorists they finance, but it does not in any way indicate that Congress meant to limit civil liability to those who personally committed acts of terrorism. On the contrary, it would be counterintuitive to conclude that Congress imposed criminal liability in sections 2339A and 2339B on those who financed terrorism, but did not intend to impose civil liability on those same persons through section 2333. Section 2339A prohibits the provision of material support for an extensive list of violent crimes associated with terrorism – assassination, kidnapping, arson, destruction of aircraft – that make clear what types of conduct Congress had in mind when it defined ‘international terrorism’ in section 2331(1) as not just the violent acts themselves, but also ‘activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life.’ There is no textual, structural or logical justification for construing the civil liability imposed by section 2333 more narrowly than the corresponding criminal provisions. Because Congress intended to impose criminal liability for funding violent terrorism, we find that it also intended through sections 2333 and 2331(1) to impose civil liability for funding at least as broad a class of violent terrorist acts. If the plaintiffs could show that HLF and QLI violated either section 2339A or section 2339B, that conduct would certainly be sufficient to meet the definition of ‘international terrorism’ under sections 2333 and 2331. Such acts would give rise to civil liability under section 2333 so long as knowledge and intent are also shown.”

Affirmed.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Lindberg, J., Rovner, J.