02-1482 Lucini Italia Company v. Giuseppe Grappolini and Grappolini G.S.R.L.

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“The district court cited two facts to support its finding of mootness: Grappolini’s agreement to maintain the status quo, and the parties’ efforts to settle the case. However, even accepting these assertions as true, they fail to demonstrate that no reasonable chance exists that Grappolini will sell flavored oils or that he will apply the trade secret information misappropriated from Lucini. Indeed, Grappolini does not argue that these facts establish mootness. Rather, he contends that the district court denied the injunction on the merits. We disagree. Because the court stated specifically that ‘plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is moot,’ we will take it at its word. Nothing in the order applies the facts of the case to the substantive elements that a party must show when requesting a preliminary injunction: 1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim; 2) no adequate remedy at law; and 3) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001). After a court has considered these three issues, it must weigh the potential harms (although such balancing may be inapplicable if Grappolini’s violation of Lucini’s rights was willful) and consider the public interest. PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). Although the court used the phrase ‘irreparable harm’ during a hearing several weeks after denying the motion for preliminary injunction, such language does not modify or appear in the order at issue. The district court never applied the facts of this case to the substantive standard a party must meet to show the need for a preliminary injunction.”

Vacated and remanded.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Norgle, J., Flaum, J.