01-2074 U.S. v. Britton

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“In the present case, the government contends that the district court’s remedy was appropriate because DeRango’s proffered testimony was easily available through another source – a billing record. DeRango’s motion to withdraw was based upon knowledge that DeRango possessed and could be used to impeach government witness Swanson. DeRango told the district court that based upon his review of certain billing records, he knew that Swanson had paid his legal bill with more than $1,200 in cash. However, in his previous testimony Swanson had admitted stealing only $500 from CCC. Thus, the impeachment value of DeRango’s testimony consisted of the inference that Swanson was lying when he stated he did not steal more than $500 in cash from CCC. Based on DeRango’s proffer, the court denied DeRango’s motion on the ground that lead counsel Cain could obtain the impeachment information through a trial subpoena of DeRango’s former firm’s billing records, and thus, DeRango’s testimony was not necessary. We agree with the district court that the information that DeRango could have provided was easily provided by the billing record and through the cross-examination of Swanson. As in Dack, we see no err in the district court’s actions as the testimony that DeRango sought to give was easily available through another source, and we conclude that neither ‘extraordinary circumstances’ nor ‘compelling reasons’ existed to find otherwise. We also see no problem with the district court’s screening off of DeRango as we have previously approved the use of such measures in order to avoid potential ethical violations.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Reinhard, J., Kanne, J.