00-9285 Mickens v. Taylor

Listen to this article

This Court rejects petitioner’s argument that the remand instruction in Wood, directing the trial court to grant a new hearing if it determined that “an actual conflict of interest existed,” id., at 273, established that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict the defendant, to obtain reversal, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, not that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. As used in the remand instruction, “an actual conflict of interest” meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. It was shorthand for Sullivan’s statement that “a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief,” 446 U.S., at 349-350 (emphasis added). The notion that Wood created a new rule sub silentio is implausible. Moreover, petitioner’s proposed rule of automatic reversal makes little policy sense. Thus, to void the conviction petitioner had to establish, at a minimum, that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance.

240 F.3d 348, affirmed.

Local effect:

The decision is consistent with Seventh Circuit law, Lipson v. U.S., 233 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2000).

Scalia, J.; Kennedy, J., concurring; Stevens, J., dissenting; Souter, J., dissenting; Breyer, J., dissenting.