00-1770 HUD v. Rucker

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Congress’ decision not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term “any” to modify “drug-related criminal activity,” precludes any knowledge requirement. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 609. Because “any” has an expansive meaning-i.e., “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5-any drug-related activity engaged in by the specified persons is grounds for termination, not just drug-related activity that the tenant knew, or should have known, about. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling that “under the tenant’s control” modifies not just “other person,” but also “member of the tenant’s household” and “guest,” runs counter to basic grammar rules and would result in a nonsensical reading. Rather, HUD offers a convincing explanation for the grammatical imperative that “under the tenant’s control” modifies only “other person”: By “control,” the statute means control in the sense that the tenant has permitted access to the premises. Implicit in the terms “household member” or “guest” is that access to the premises has been granted by the tenant. Section §1437d(l)(6)’s unambiguous text is reinforced by comparing it to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), which subjects all leasehold interests to civil forfeiture when used to commit drug-related criminal activities, but expressly exempts tenants who had no knowledge of the activity, thereby demonstrating that Congress knows exactly how to provide an “innocent owner” defense. It did not provide one in §1437d(l)(6). Given that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Chevron, supra, at 842, other considerations with which the Ninth Circuit attempted to bolster its holding are unavailing, including the legislative history, the erroneous conclusion that the plain reading of the statute leads to absurd results, the canon of constitutional avoidance, and reliance on inapposite decisions of this Court to cast doubt on §1437d(l)(6)’s constitutionality under the Due Process Clause.

237 F.3d 1113, reversed and remanded.

Local effect:

The issue has not been considered by the Seventh Circuit.

Rehnquist, C. J.