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01-2081 Thielman v. Leean, et al.

By: dmc-admin//March 11, 2002//

01-2081 Thielman v. Leean, et al.

By: dmc-admin//March 11, 2002//

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“Just as Sandin dealt with prison regulations, it also dealt with a prison and a prisoner. Although the WRC, in part, houses correctional inmates, it cannot be termed a prison with regard to Chapter 980 patients.

The entire premise of Wisconsin’s sexually violent person commitment scheme is that a patient is not confined as punishment for his earlier criminal behavior. Otherwise, the confinement scheme would run afoul of the double jeopardy provision. Nonetheless, facilities dealing with those who have been involuntarily committed for sexual disorders are ‘volatile’ environments whose day-to-day operations cannot be managed from on high. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1982) (extending ‘professional judgment’ standard to substantive due process claim brought by involuntarily committed mental patient and noting that such a presumption was ‘necessary to enable institutions of this type – often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed – to continue to function’). Moreover, even though Thielman is not formally a prisoner, his confinement has deprived him (legally) of a substantial measure of his physical liberty. Sandin teaches that any person already confined may not nickel and dime his way into a federal claim by citing small, incremental deprivations of physical freedom. Sandin’s reasoning applies with equal force to persons confined under Chapter 980. In order to state a procedural due process claim deriving from state law, Thielman must identify a right to be free from restraint that imposes atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of his confinement.

“The State argues that the dangerousness of Chapter 980 patients warrants their restraint during transport.

Although the involuntary commitment of a person under Chapter 51 can be accomplished by showing, among other things, a ‘substantial probability of physical harm’ to the patient or others, Chapter 980 patients have a previous conviction (or acquittal based on their mental condition) to evidence their dangerousness. Moreover, as the State points out, they are subject to indefinite commitment, heightening their desire to escape. Last, it is not unreasonable for the State to believe that a person with a mental disorder of a sexual nature is qualitatively more dangerous than another mental patient who nonetheless threatens danger to himself or others. Accordingly, Wisconsin has a rational basis for drawing distinctions between Chapter 980 and Chapter 51 patients with regard to the use of restraints.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Crabb, J., Evans, J.

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