01-1910 Israel, et al. v. U.S.D.A.

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“[T]he Agreement provides for 50% recapture of appreciation on whichever of the following dates occurs first: the Agreement’s expiration on September 14, 1999, the date plaintiffs pay the loan in full, the date the plaintiffs cease farming, or the date that the plaintiffs transfer title of their property. Both parties agree that plaintiffs did not pay their loan in full, cease farming, or transfer the title of their property…

“Plaintiffs contend, however, that the Agreement does not provide a formula for recapture at the expiration date of the Agreement, and therefore, the Agreement’s expiration should not constitute a triggering event. The formula provision states that the amount of recapture ‘will be based on the difference between the value of the security at the time of disposal or cessation by Borrower of farming and the value of the security at the time [the] Agreement is entered into.’ Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive.

“Director Cooper found that the plain language of recapture provision provides for recapture at the expiration date of the Agreement, and we agree. The recapture provision clearly states that recapture is allowed at ‘the expiration date of the Agreement.’ We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the formula provision negates the clear language of the recapture provision solely because the formula provision does not mention the expiration date of the Agreement explicitly, as does the recapture provision. Because the plain language of the Agreement provides for recapture at ‘the expiration date of the Agreement,’ we cannot conclude that the agency’s determinations were ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ or ‘unsupported by substantial evidence.'”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Crabb, J., Kanne, J.