01-3215 In the Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings

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“[T]he district court found that the ‘records did exist’ and that Rinaldi was not ‘going to furnish the records voluntarily, because [Rinaldi] d[id]n’t think the Government ha[d] a right to them.’ Therefore, the district court wanted to coerce Rinaldi into involuntarily producing the responsive documents.

Further, although the order stated that Rinaldi could be imprisoned for up to six months, the order specified that Rinaldi was ‘to be released . . . at any time, upon his furnishing the records called for by and to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.’ Likewise, the fine was to be imposed only until Rinaldi ‘complie[d] with [the] grand jury subpoena.’ At the August 13, 2001 hearing, the district court stated that it did not ‘want to keep [Rinaldi] in jail one minute, and all [he had] to do to get out [was] tell [the court] what happened to those records.’ Therefore, Rinaldi’s ‘key’ to being released required him to either produce the documents or to convince the court that the documents no longer existed. As in Lippitt, the court did not order a set prison term, but rather allowed Rinaldi to be released if he complied with its order. Therefore, because Rinaldi retained the ability to ‘purge’ the contempt, the court’s order was a paradigmatic, coercive, civil sanction. See id. at 877.

“Rinaldi also asserted that he may not be both imprisoned and fined for civil contempt pursuant to United States v. Holloway, 991 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1993). In Holloway, we held that a contemnor may not be both imprisoned and fined for criminal contempt. See id. at 374. However, in ‘contrast [with criminal contempt], a court may punish civil contempt by both a fine and imprisonment.’ Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., 138 F.3d 996, 1005 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998); see also In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1980). Therefore, because the contempt order in this case was civil, Rinaldi’s argument was rejected.

“Finally, Rinaldi contended that the monetary fine imposed violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. However, a fine assessed for civil contempt does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v. Mongelli, 2 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1993).”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, McDade, J., Kanne, J.