00-2607 U.S. v. Wallace

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“Wallace first argues that the district court ‘lacked subject matter jurisdiction’ once the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated his felony conviction. As the government appropriately notes, Wallace’s argument is not really one of subject matter jurisdiction, see United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-33 (7th Cir. 1998), but rather a dispute concerning whether the government proved all of the elements necessary to sustain a conviction under sec. 922(g)(1). That question is easily answered because Wallace necessarily admitted every element comprising the offense charged after he pled guilty. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (‘a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge.’). The elements comprising a sec. 922(g)(1) violation are: (1) possession of a firearm; (2) that had traveled in interstate commerce; (3) by a felon. See United States v. Quintanilla, 218 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2000). By pleading guilty, Wallace admitted that he had a prior felony conviction, and he may not challenge that admission before this court.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Moody, J., Flaum, J.