00-3229 Proffitt v. Ridgway, et al.

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This case is unusual, moreover, in that the risk of serious harm was not only, perhaps not even mainly, to Woodall, the person in custody, but also to Ridgway, the police officer. Unless Ridgway was suicidal or insane, neither of which possibility is suggested, he would not have failed to take additional precautions against the car crash and ensuing struggle (and resulting death of Woodall) had he known that he was running a substantial risk that Woodall would crash the car, break out, and perhaps kill him. Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff’s Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1446-47 and n. 3 (10th Cir. 1990); Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 538 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (concurring opinion). This circumstance makes it impossible to infer that Ridgway knew that Woodall and there fore himself were at substantial risk of being killed or seriously injured. Hence the district court was right to grant summary judgment for Ridgway with respect to the claim that he exhibited deliberate indifference to Woodall’s safety by failing to confine him more securely in the police car.”

“[W]e do not think that the rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a public officer transforms a bystander into a state actor, exposing him to liability under federal law and, by doing so, discouraging people from helping the police. We cannot find a case on point but common sense and analogy carry the day. To assist the police is a duty of citizenship; and the performance of a duty to someone does not turn the performer into that someone.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Scott, J., Posner, J.