00-957 Kansas v. Crane

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Hendricks referred to the Act as requiring an abnormality or disorder that makes it “difficult, if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.” Id., at 358. The word “difficult” indicates that the lack of control was not absolute. Indeed, an absolutist approach is unworkable and would risk barring the civil commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities. Yet a distinction between a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment and “other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings,” id., at 360, is necessary lest “civil commitment” become a “mechanism for retribution or general deterrence,” id., at 372-373. In Hendricks, this Court did not give “lack of control” a particularly narrow or technical meaning, and in cases where it is at issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. The Constitution’s liberty safeguards in the area of mental illness are not always best enforced through precise bright-line rules. States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment; and psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law. Consequently, the Court has sought to provide constitutional guidance in this area by proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally stated constitutional standards and objectives as specific circumstances require, the approach embodied in Henricks. That Hendricks limited its discussion to volitional disabilities is not surprising, as the case involved pedophiliaûa mental abnormality involving what a lay person might describe as a lack of control. But when considering civil commitment, the Court has not ordinarily distinguished for constitutional purposes between volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354. The Court in Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement based solely on “emotional” abnormality would be constitutional, and has no occasion to do so here.”

Vacated and remanded.

Local Effect: The decision raises possible questions about Wisconsin’s sexually violent person law, Chapter 980, which does not speak to the respondent’s difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior, but rather substantial probability of reoffending. Wisconsin courts will soon be facing the question whether the two are equivalent.

Breyer, J.; Scalia, J., dissenting

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kansas, 269 Kan. 578, 7 P.3d 285.