99-1823 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.

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The Fourth Circuit based its decision on its evaluation of the “competing policies” implemented by the ADA and the FAA, rather than on any language in either the statutes or the arbitration agreement between Baker and respondent. If the EEOC could prosecute its claim only with Baker’s consent, or if its prayer for relief could be dictated by Baker, the lower court’s analysis might be persuasive. But once a charge is filed, the exact opposite is true under the ADA, which clearly makes the EEOC the master of its own case, conferring on it the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake and to determine whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief. Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ attempt to balance policy goals against the arbitration agreement’s clear language is inconsistent with this Court’s cases holding that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. E.g., Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478. Because the EEOC is not a party to the contract and has not agreed to arbitrate its claims, the FAA’s proarbitration policy goals do not require the agency to relinquish its statutory authority to pursue victim-specific relief, regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes.

Reversed and remanded.

Local Effect: The decision overturns current Seventh Circuit law, EEOC v. Harris Chernan, 10 F.3d 1286, 1290 (7th Cir. 1993)(EEOC and employee in privity, and EEOC may only seek injunctive relief, not victim-specific judicial relief if arbitration or res judicata applies).

Stevens, J.; Thomas, J., dissenting.

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 193 F.3d 805, reversed and remanded.