“[N]one of [these attributes] is enough to bring Lopez within the definition of a Title VII supervisor – as there is nothing in the record indicating that Bodine entrusted him with the authority to ‘hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline’ Hall.
“[T]he fact that an employer authorizes one employee to oversee aspects of another employee’s job performance does not establish a Title VII supervisory relationship. An individual is not a supervisor unless he possesses the authority to directly affect the terms and conditions of a victim’s employment. See, e.g., Haugerud v. Amery School Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 696- 97 (7th Cir. 2001) (employer may only be held vicariously liable for the acts of those who can be considered the employer’s proxy – an individual holding a sufficiently high position in the management hierarchy of the company). The type of marginal discretion Lopez had over Hall’s work operations is not sufficient to impute Title VII vicarious liability to an employer. See, e.g., Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034. Additionally, Hall’s own actions indicate that she never considered Lopez to be her supervisor. Whenever she had a complaint, she spoke with her actual supervisor … or the human resources department, not with Lopez or anyone else in his capacity.”
“Hall was sexually harassed by a co- employee, not a supervisor. Because Bodine promptly addressed the harassment upon being apprised of the behavior, the company may not be held liable for Lopez’s conduct. As such, the district court’s decision to grant Bodine’s motion for summary judgment of this claim was appropriate.”
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Kocoras, J., Manion, J.