00-4268 Shropshear v. Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, et al.

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“The reason is the reciprocal relation between the length of the limitations period and the grounds for tolling (extending) it. E.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661-62 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975); Cange v. Stotler, supra, 826 F.2d at 599-600 (concurring opinion). A state might decide to set a short period but allow generous tolling, or a long period in lieu of generous tolling. If the federal courts used the short period in conjunction with a tolling doctrine less generous than that of the state that had set the period, or the long period in conjunction with a tolling doctrine more generous than that of the state, it would be creating an irrational hybrid.”

“Because of the intracircuit conflict… our opinion has been circulated to the full court in advance of publication, in accordance with 7th Cir. R. 40(e). No judge of the court in regular active service voted to hear the case en banc.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Gottschall, J., Posner, J.