01-1220 Talano v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation Inc.

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“Talano’s statement that there are ‘several reasons’ to reconsider is devoid of specificity. Similar to the motion in Martinez, which failed to state any grounds for reconsideration, blanket statements, such as ‘several reasons,’ provide no greater specificity than saying nothing at all. Additionally, Talano failed to supply any citations in support of his broad assertions that the district court ‘misapplied fundamental principles, failed to apply other well-recognized principles, and is in conflict with precedent of the Seventh Circuit construing Illinois state contract law.’ Without more, these assertions do not satisfy Rule 7(b)(1). Therefore, because Talano’s motion did not toll the thirty-day period for filing a timely appeal, Talano’s Jan. 25, 2001 appeal of the district court’s Aug. 3, 2000 order was untimely.

“Likewise, Talano’s memorandum in support of his Motion for Reconsideration submitted on Sept. 7 did not toll the 30-day period for filing a timely appeal. This memorandum was filed well outside the 10-day period provided for filing a proper Rule 59(e) motion. As this Court explained in Martinez, ‘if a party could file a skeleton motion and later fill it in, the purpose of the time limitation would be defeated.’ 556 F.2d at 820; see also Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wis., 957 F.2d 515, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1992) (‘An empty motion cannot reserve time to file an explanation after the ten days allowed by Rule 59.’).

“The district court’s acceptance of Talano’s supporting memorandum also does not implicate the doctrine of unique circumstances. This doctrine ‘relieves a party from the consequences of filing a late notice of appeal where the district court has affirmatively assured the party that his motion has tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal.’ Hope, 43 F.3d at 1143 (citation omitted). Unless the district court granted Talano specific assurances that his motion tolled the appeal clock, ‘no unique circumstances existed and the appeal clock remained running.’ … Nothing in the record indicates that the district court gave Talano any assurances prior to the expiration of the 30-day period for filing a timely appeal, much less a specific assurance, which would arguably allow Talano’s inadequate Rule 59(e) motion to toll the 30-day period.”

Dismissed and affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Nordberg, J., Kanne, J.