By: dmc-admin//December 10, 2001//
“[The defendant] submits that these provisions are void under the vagueness doctrine because the statute fails to define ‘knowingly or intentionally … to possess with intent to … distribute … a controlled substance.’ 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1). Further, he contends, 21 U.S.C. sec. 846 is constitutionally infirm because it does not define an ‘attempt or conspiracy’ to violate sec. 841(a)(1).
“Section 841 cannot be characterized as in any way vague. The statute’s ‘absolute prohibition against the manufacture, use and possession of controlled substances provides an explicit warning against dealing with any quantity.’ United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 980 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). The Government was required to prove that he had entered into an agreement to distribute ‘cocaine base.’ The indictment specifically defined this latter term as the substance ‘commonly known as “crack” cocaine.’ R.1, Ex.61. The presence of the requirement that Mr. Collins undertake this activity ‘knowingly and intentionally’ ensured that he would be convicted only if he deliberately agreed to undertake this activity.”
Affirmed.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Herndon, J., Ripple, J.