00-3521, 00-3847 U.S. v. Brown

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“Everyone pretty much knows what a panderer is – quaint language in a 70-year-old Kentucky case colorfully tells us that he is someone ‘who procures for another the gratification for his lusts. He is a panderer who solicits trade for a prostitute, or lewd woman.’ Lutes v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 620 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1930). The Illinois statute under which Brown was convicted describes two kinds of panderers, one being someone who merely ‘arranges’ a situation in which a person may practice prostitution and the other being someone who ‘compels’ a person to become a prostitute … Brown was charged and convicted under the ‘compelling’ prong of the statute.

“We respectfully disagree with the district judge’s conclusion because we think it ignores the compelled, nonconsensual nature of the prostitute’s acts under the compelling prong of the Illinois pandering law. We think forced nonconsensual sex with strangers is ‘conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’ as proscribed under the ‘otherwise’ clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.”

Affirmed in part, and vacated in part.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Reinhard, J., Evans, J.