99-4251 U.S. v. Danser

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“A term of supervised release begins on the day an individual is released from incarceration. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3624(e). The term of any supervised release ‘runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense to which the person is subject during the supervised release.’ Id. The Sentencing Guidelines also provide that, in the event an individual has served consecutive terms of imprisonment, the terms of supervised release are ‘to run concurrently with any other term of supervised release imposed.’ USSG sec. 5G1.2, comment (1998). The district court did not heed the above language.

“Whether a victim may be compensated for the anticipated future costs of psychological treatment under section 2259 is a question of first impression in this circuit. Our sister circuits, in deciding this question, have determined that such awards are permissible. See United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999). Danser argues that those courts have decided the issue incorrectly and, instead, victims of abuse should be required to petition courts to recover the costs of treatment as those costs are incurred.

“We do not believe that Congress sought to create such a cumbersome procedure for victims to receive restitution. In enacting section 2259, it is clear that Congress intended to provide victims of sexual abuse with expansive relief for ‘the full amount of …

[their] losses’ suffered as a result of abuse. sec. 2259(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Congress chose unambiguously to use unqualified language in prescribing full restitution for victims. Indeed, in the legislative history of the contested statute, Congress cites the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In that case, the Court discussed, at great length, the devastating and long term effects that the sexual exploitation of children can have both upon the victims of that abuse and greater society. Id. In light of Congress’s intent to make whole those victims of sexual exploitation, we find that section 2259 allows for restitutionary damages for the future costs of therapy.”

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Tinder, J., Flaum, J.