00-1021 Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, et al.

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“This case does not fit within the thin middle ground established by [United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir.1991)], but is a case where [Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)] applies. What puts this case beyond Berkowitz – as well as [United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)] and [U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)] – and is most critical here, is that Sparing stood inside his home, behind his closed screen door. He was neither in a public place, e.g., outside (Watson), voluntarily in an open doorway, also a public place (Santana), or answering a knock at the door and standing fractions of an inch behind an open doorway (Berkowitz). Because we are guided not by the ‘common law of property,’ Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, but by the Fourth Amendment privacy interest as identified in Katz, this difference is significant. Sparing was not exposed to ‘public view, speech, hearing, and touch’ as if he were standing outside, in a public place (voluntarily or otherwise). As a consequence, we apply Payton – Sparing did not surrender any reasonable expectations of privacy in his home. Without a warrant, this arrest could only be completed if Sparing opened his screen door, and stepped outside of his home or acquiesced to a slight entry to complete the arrest. For Keith to enter the home without a warrant, as he did in this case, he first needed Sparing’s consent.”

“Although Sparing has demonstrated a constitutional violation, he cannot show that the violation was clearly established under the second part of the standard for qualified immunity. Indeed, we are in agreement with the First Circuit in concluding that the law surrounding Fourth Amendment ‘doorway arrest’ questions, particularly on the facts of this case, was not sufficiently settled or defined at the time of the arrest to defeat qualified immunity in this case. See generally Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). Thus, Keith was appropriately entitled to summary judgment for Sparing’s Fourth Amendment warrant claim under section 1983.”

Affirmed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Norgle, J., Williams, J.