00-0076 State ex rel. Spriggie Hensley v. Endicott

Listen to this article

Although plaintiff argued that there was a “futility” exception to the PLRA, that it would essentially be futile to require plaintiff to bring his constitutional challenges to the rules in question before the institution’s complaint review committees and appeal personnel as a precondition to raising them in court, that argument fails to comport with the plain language of the PLRA.

“The plain language contains no exception regarding futility. It is not within our judicial function to insert the phrase ‘where they are not shown to be futile’ after ‘administrative remedies’ in the statute. Therefore, we conclude that the plain language of the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all their administrative remedies prior to challenging a condition in their respective facilities through any civil actions or special proceedings, including common law writs of certiorari.”

In addition, we conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Wis. Stat. Sec. 227.40(1), a declaratory judgment statute, trumps the PLRA in this context.

This is so because the PLRA is more specific than sec. 227.40(1) in that it is targeted at challenges to “conditions in the facility” while sec. 227.40(1) broadly allows judicial review of any administrative “rule.” And, the fact that the PLRA trumps sec. 227.40(1) where challenges are made to a condition in the facility where a prisoner is incarcerated is bolstered by the fact that the PLRA was passed later in time than sec. 227.40(1).

Reversed.

DISSENTING OPINION: Bradley, J., with whom Abrahamson, J., joins. “Having asserted a meritorious constitutional challenge, this case now only involves the question of what procedural route a prisoner must take in a limited circumstance-when a prisoner raises a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of an administrative rule. I conclude that Wis. Stat. sec. 227.40(1) is controlling because it more specifically applies to a facial challenge to an administrative rule. Because of the interplay between the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements and the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) complaint procedure, a conclusion to the contrary would lead to an absurd result. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.”

Court of Appeals, Wilcox, J.

Attorneys:

For Appellant: Beth Ermatinger Hanan, Milwaukee

For Respondent: Michael D. Oeser, James E. Doyle, Madison