99-2047 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

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“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle. The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions… The Takings Clause, however, in certain circumstances allows a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the State’s regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation. Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title. Were we to accept the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”

“Petitioner accepts the Council’s contention and the state trial court’s finding that his parcel retains $200,000 in development value under the State’s wetlands regulations. He asserts, nonetheless, that he has suffered a total taking and contends the Council cannot sidestep the holding in Lucas ‘by the simple expedient of leaving a landowner a few crumbs of value.’ Assuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest. This is not the situation of the landowner in this case, however. A regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property ‘economically idle.’… The claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined, and for this purpose the case should be remanded.”

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.

Local Effect:

The decision is consistent with current Wisconsin law, Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis.2d 365, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996).

Kennedy, J.; O’Connor, J., concurring; Scalia, J., concurring; Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Ginsburg, J., dissenting; Breyer, J., dissenting.

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707.