00-767 INS v. St. Cyr; 00-1011 Calcano-Martinez v. INS

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“[E]ven assuming that the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a common law judge with power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to accept the INS’s submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise… The necessity of resolving such a serious and difficult constitutional issue – and the desirability of avoiding that necessity – simply reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of constitutional intent.”

“We find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of sec. 212(c) retroactively to such aliens. We therefore hold that sec. 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like respondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for sec. 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.”

Affirmed.

Local Effect:

The Seventh Circuit nominally states that it has no jurisdiction, but regularly reviews such cases anyway, under the theory that it retains jurisdiction to hear substantial constitutional issues as a “safety valve” to prevent bizarre miscarriages of justice. LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir.1998). These decisions change the procedure, however, from direct review to habeas corpus.

Stevens, J.; O’Connor, J., dissenting; Scalia, J., dissenting.

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 229 F.3d 406, and 232 F.3d 328.

00-1011 Calcano-Martinez v. INS

http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1011.ZS.html