00-2862 Robbin Weaver v. Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc.

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“[T]he fact that a river as a whole is navigable is not dispositive for purposes of maritime law. See, e.g., Leblanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (dammed river not navigable even though it was capable of supporting interstate commerce downstream from the location at issue).”

“The case before us presents a similar factual scenario. Based on the stipulations in this case, it is probable that the waters in which the City Lights I made its 300-yard trips are not ‘navigable in fact.’ The dam and bridge which obstructed the City Lights I indicate – at this location – a river which cannot be used as a highway for maritime commerce. A dam and bridge which prevent a riverboat casino from traveling over 300 yards are presumably not susceptible to commercial shipping, and thus fail the test set forth in The Daniel Ball.”

“In addition, if the enclosed portion of the Fox River at issue here is not navigable upstream or downstream for commercial shipping, it is also impossible to engage in interstate travel from this location. This part of the river, located in Aurora, Illinois, is entirely intrastate. ‘Those cases in which circuit courts have found dammed waterways navigable for jurisdictional purposes are easily distinguished by the fact that the waterway in question formed the border between two states, thereby rendering it capable of supporting interstate commerce despite the existence of artificial dams blocking downstream flow.’ Leblanc, 198 F.3d at 359. Because the waterway in this instance is located entirely within the state of Illinois, and given the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this small, enclosed, intrastate section of river is unlikely to qualify as a navigable water under general maritime law.”

“In this case, the record makes it unlikely that jurisdiction existed, and the district court has made no inquiry into the navigability of the Fox River where the City Lights I was located. A remand is appropriate in these circumstances so the district court may determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.”

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Bucklo, J., Manion, J.