Weekly Case Digests — Feb. 22-26, 2016

Listen to this article

WI Court of Appeals

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Theodore K. Sanderfoot

Case No.: 2014AP1227

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J. and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Civil Commitments

Theodore Sanderfoot appeals from orders denying his WIS. STAT. § 980.09 (2013-14) petition for discharge from his ch. 980 commitment and denying his motion for a new discharge hearing due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We agree with the circuit court that counsel was effective at the discharge hearing. We further conclude that the circuit court did not err in excluding references at the discharge hearing to the length of Sanderfoot’s extended supervision. We affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, et al.

Case No.: 2014AP2928; 2014AP2929; 2014AP2930; 2014AP2931; 2014AP2932; 2014AP2933

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus:  Unemployment Benefits

This case involves an appeal by DWD to the circuit court contesting an award by LIRC of unemployment benefits for seven individuals. Despite only one of the individuals having a connection to Kenosha county, DWD brought all seven lawsuits there to seek unified judicial resolution of a particular and shared legal question.2 But substantive review never came. The circuit court dismissed the six actions with no connection to Kenosha county,3 concluding that DWD did not comply with WIS. STAT. § 102.23(1)(a) because it filed the cases in an improper venue. The court ruled that this defect compelled dismissal because it lacked the competency to proceed. On appeal, DWD contends that any defect in venue did not impair the court’s competency. DWD further argues that even if it did, the court still retained the power to transfer the cases or consolidate them into a single proceeding. We disagree and affirm the circuit court’s actions in this case. We hold that the venue provision in WIS. STAT. § 102.23(1)(a) is central to the statutory scheme and did deprive the court of competency. The circuit court was further correct that the proper remedy was dismissal of the six improperly venued cases.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District III

Case Name: Jennifer R. Koenig, et al. V. Pierce County Department of Human Services

Case No.: 2015AP410

Officials: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Focus: Violation of Due Process

The Pierce County Department of Human Services (DHS) appeals a judgment reversing an administrative panel’s decision that Jennifer Koenig engaged in child maltreatment in the operation of her day care business. The circuit court concluded reversal was warranted because Koenig’s due process rights were violated during the administrative proceedings. DHS argues that conclusion was erroneous, and it also contends the court erred by denying its motion to dismiss. We reject these arguments and affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Gilbert R. Lawrence

Case No.: 2015AP535-CR; 2015AP536-CR

Officials: Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

Focus: Motion to Withdraw

In these consolidated appeals, Gilbert R. Lawrence appeals pro se from an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his no contest pleas. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Lawrence’s motion and affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: S.O. V. T.R.

Case No.: 2015AP548; 2015AP549

Officials: Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.

Focus: Injunction – Statutory Interpretation

Todd appeals from the trial court’s orders granting child abuse injunctions against him as to his two minor children, Adam and Kyle, after their mother (Todd’s ex-wife), Susan, filed petitions pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 813.122 (2013-14) alleging that Todd had abused them. On appeal, Todd argues that the trial court: (1) improperly raised legal issues that were waived due to the issues not having been argued at trial or in Todd’s prior appeal; (2) that the trial court improperly engaged in statutory interpretation of WIS. STAT. §48.02(1)(gm) because the statute is unambiguous; and (3) that even if § 48.02(1)(gm) is deemed ambiguous, the trial court’s interpretation was incorrect and should be reversed. We disagree and affirm.

Recommended for publication

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District II

Case Name: Scott Weigert v. Heartland Financial USA, Inc.

Case No.: 2015AP1500

Officials: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

Focus: Breach of Contract

Scott Weigert appeals an order granting the motion of Heartland Financial USA, Inc., (the Bank) to dismiss Weigert’s complaint alleging that the Bank breached a real estate sales contract. We agree with the circuit court that there was no breach because there was no contract. We affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Norbert Trzebiatowski, et al. V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Case No.: 2014AP1086

Officials: Lundsten, Higginbotham and Blanchard, JJ.

Focus: Breach of Contract – Bad Faith

The Trzebiatowskis sued State Farm in the circuit court asserting breach of contract and bad faith claims. The parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment, which the court resolved by granting the Trzebiatowskis’ motion on their breach of contract claim, and at the same time denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the Trzebiatowskis’ bad faith claim. The Trzebiatowskis then sought statutory interest on their breach of contract claim, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 628.46 (2011-12),2 which the court granted.

As for the Trzebiatowskis’ bad faith claim, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of this claim because State Farm had a reasonable basis to deny coverage under the Windstar policy. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment on the Trzebiatowskis’ breach of contract claim, and affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the Trzebiatowskis’ bad faith claim. Because the Trzebiatowskis did not prevail on their breach of contract claim, dismissal of their statutory interest claim is required.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Michael E. Spiess

Case No.: 2014AP1475-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Sherman, JJ.

Focus: Resentencing – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Michael Spiess appeals an order of the circuit court denying his postconviction motion for resentencing and his motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Spiess contends that he should be resentenced because the circuit court improperly relied on disclosures made by him that he asserts under terms of his plea agreement with the State could only be used as a mitigating factor, that the presentence investigation report (PSI) process violated his due process rights, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District I

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Jose M. Morales

Case No.: 2015AP712-CR

Officials: Kloppenburg, P.J., Lundsten and Higginbotham, JJ.

Focus: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jose Morales appeals a judgment of conviction for drug-related crimes. He also appeals the postconviction order in which the circuit court denied his nine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, without holding a Machner evidentiary hearing. Morales argues that the circuit court erred in rejecting his ineffective assistance claims without holding a Machner hearing. For the reasons stated below, we disagree and affirm the circuit court.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: State of Wisconsin v. Damien L. Wilson

Case No.: 2015AP760

Officials: Lundsten, Higginbotham, and Blanchard, JJ.

Focus: New Evidence – General Appeal

The State appeals an order granting a new trial to Damien Wilson on the ground of newly discovered evidence. We affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: City of Madison v. Jeffrey K. Crossfield

Case No.: 2015AP800

Officials: KLOPPENBURG, P.J.

Focus: Court Error

Jeffrey Crossfield, pro se, appeals the order of the circuit court affirming the municipal court’s decision finding him guilty of failure to obey an official traffic sign or signal in violation of the Madison General Ordinance adopting WIS. STAT. § 346.04(2). As an initial matter, I observe that Crossfield’s appellate brief is confusing, rambling, and unorganized. I have labored to discern Crossfield’s arguments and to address them in this opinion. Although Crossfield is pro se, he is “bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys on appeal.” Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992). I discern Crossfield’s arguments to be that the circuit court erred in two respects: (1) finding that the sign that Crossfield allegedly failed to obey read “right lane closed-merge left” such that Crossfield failed to obey it when he did not merge left; and (2) finding that that sign was an “official” sign when, according to Crossfield, the sign did not conform with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). For the reasons set forth below, I reject Crossfield’s arguments and affirm.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Brandon Michael Steele v. Ronald E. Latko, Jr., et al.

Case No.: 2015AP1060

Officials: LUNDSTEN, J.

Focus: Breach of Contract

Brandon Steele appeals a judgment entered after a bench trial on Steele’s small claims replevin action against Ronald and Kendra Latko. Steele claimed that the Latkos were in wrongful possession of his salt & pepper giant schnauzer, Molly, and that the Latkos breached a contract relating to Molly. The circuit court rejected Steele’s claims, concluding that Steele transferred ownership of Molly to the Latkos in an unambiguous written contract. For the reasons that follow, I affirm the judgment.

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: John Joseph Miller v. Mayo Health System and Dr. Tim Johnson

Case No.: 2015AP1213

Officials: HIGGINBOTHAM, J.

Focus: General Appeal – Motion to Dismiss

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Unifund CCR, LLC v. Annette M. Andereson

Case No.: 205AP1231

Officials: LUNDSTEN, J.

Focus: Small Claims – Money Judgment – Adequacy of Evidence

Annette Anderson appeals, pro se, a small claims money judgment against her in favor of Unifund CCR. For the reasons stated below, I affirm the judgment

Full Text

WI Court of Appeals – District IV

Case Name: Bay Shore Apartments v. Jennifer Westphal

Case No.: 2015AP1663

Officials: SHERMAN, J.

Focus: Landlord Tenants

Jennifer Westphal, pro se, appeals a judgment of eviction. Westphal contends that the court erred in determining that her landlord, Bay Shore Apartments provided her with proper notice, and in determining that she breached a condition of her lease. For the reasons discussed below, I affirm.

Full Text

WI Supreme Court

WI Supreme Court

Case Name: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael J. Hicks

Case No.: 2014AP7-D

Focus: Disciplinary Proceedings

Lawyer receives two year suspension for pattern of misconduct.

” As the referee noted, there is a general pattern to Attorney Hicks’ misconduct. His practice focused primarily on representing indigent defendants in criminal cases through appointments by the Office of the State Public Defender (SPD) or by a court. While Attorney Hicks would usually send an initial letter to the client notifying him/her of the appointment and his representation, he would largely ignore the client for extended periods of time. At times, Attorney Hicks would fail to follow through on necessary actions. At some point the OLR would receive a grievance, which they would send to Attorney Hicks for a written response. Attorney Hicks would either never respond, or he would provide an initial response that the OLR deemed inadequate and he would then fail to respond to the OLR’s requests for further information.”

Full Text

7^th Circuit Digests

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name:  Danielle Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Center

Case No.: 14-3705

Officials: POSNER, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Attorney Fees

Court did not commit legal error or abuse of discretion in relying on previous attorney’s fees assessment of whether attorney fees reasonable in current case.

“We have said, “a previous attorney’s fee award is useful for establishing a reasonable market rate for similar work.” Pickett II, 664 F.3d at 648. So, the district court was acting in accordance with the principles outlined in Pickett II when it considered Rossiello’s fee award in Johnson. The district court did not err by considering, as part of its analysis, Rossiello’s hourly rate as determined in Johnson. See Small, 264 F.3d at 708(finding no abuse of discretion where the district court considered Rossiello’s fee award in similar cases to determine Rossiello’s hourly rate in Small).”

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Harold Lacy

Case No.: 15-2740

Officials: BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PETERSON, District Judge.

Focus: Sentencing – Abuse of Discretion

Appellants raider of right to appeal sentence warrants dismissal of appeal filed to combat lengthy federal sentence.

“The waiver’s broad sweep includes the substantive issue that Lacy raises here: whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence. The sentence Lacy received falls plainly within the statutory maximum, which would have been 30 years in light of Lacy’s criminal history. Lacy’s argument runs head‐on into our decision in United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 2011), where we held that the decision to impose a consecutive sentence falls easily within the scope of a similarly worded appeal waiver. We have recognized several due process limitations on appeal waivers, United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192– 93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2864 (2014), but Lacy does not invoke any of those. Because the issue Lacy raises on appeal is within the scope of the waiver he entered, and be‐ cause the appeal does not raise due process concerns, appellate review is barred. Id.”

Appeal Dismissed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Riley Forsythe v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Case No.: 15-2333

Officials: POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Disability Benefits

Administrative Law Judge improperly denies benefits to appellant who was considered totally disabled by same judge.

“That the administrative law judge gave no real considera- tion to the question what jobs the plaintiff can perform is shown by the fact that right after noting that the vocational expert had said that although the Dictionary of Occupational Titles classifies cashier jobs as semi-skilled the Dictionary is out of date and that he was reclassifying those jobs as un- skilled, the administrative law judge said: “the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the information con- tained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” So the ad- ministrative law judge wasn’t paying attention.”

Reversed and Remanded

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Chad Taylor v. Sardar Biglari

Case No.: 15-1828

Officials: POSNER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Shareholder Derivative Suit – Demand Futility

Plaintiff’s allege that board approval of transactions seemingly to the benefit of its CEO only without sound factual support.

“The plaintiffs argue that some of the directors are be- holden to Biglari and thus not independent. One is conceded to have close personal ties to him, dating from the time when he was Biglari’s professor at Trinity University in Tex- as. This may raise a question about that director’s independence, but that leaves four other directors (besides Biglari). They are a solid majority of the six-member board and the entire membership of the Governance, Compensation and Nominating Committee. One of the four had served on the board of a company that Biglari tried unsuccessfully to take over—but that doesn’t suggest he’s in Biglari’s pocket! An- other, Ruth J. Person, resigned in 2014 as chancellor of the University of Michigan-Flint, a branch of the University of Michigan, and the plaintiffs argue that she’s now financially dependent on her salary as a member of the board of Biglari Holdings and so will kowtow to Biglari. That’s unlikely. That a director is paid for his or her services does not establish the kind of financial interest that would excuse demand. Grobow v. Perot, supra, 539 A.2d at 188. Nor is Person financially dependent on her income as a member of Biglari Holdings’ board. She did not retire from the university, but merely returned to her professorship (she is a professor of management) at the university. Her website recites an extensive list of distinguished positions that she has held. “Ruth Per- son, Ph.D., Professor of Management,” www.umflint.edu/som/ruth-person (visited Feb. 16, 2016).”

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Alma Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, et al.

Case No.: 15-1419

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Cruel & Unusual Punishment

Appellant fails to produce sufficient evidence to combat summary judgment in matter alleging 8^th amendment violation on behalf of deceased son.

“Further, where a plaintiff alleges that a lack of a policy caused a constitutional violation, she must produce “more evidence than a single incident to establish liability.” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–23 (1985)). She must produce evidence of a “series of incidents” (Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 638 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1419 (2015)), or a “widespread practice constituting custom and usage.” Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (a “widespread practice” argument “would focus on the application of the policy to many different individuals”). Evidence of a series of incidents permits the inference that “there is a true municipal policy at issue,” and allows the factfinder “to understand what the omission means.” Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380. By presenting a series of incidents where “the same problem has arisen many times and the [government entity] has acquiesced in the outcome,” a plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence that the lack of policy is in fact a de facto policy choice, not a discrete omission. Id. However, “[w]ithout evidence that a series of incidents brought the risk at issue to the attention of the policymaker, we cannot infer that the lack of a policy is the result of deliberate indifference.” Hahn, 762 F.3d at 637–38 (citing Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380).”

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Melissa Callahan v. City of Chicago, Illinois

Case No.: 15-1318

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, and BRUCE, District Judge.

Focus: Minimum Wage

Appellant argues that state should compensate her difference between her wage and standard for minimum wage.

“Callahan asks us to deem Chicago her employer under the seven open‐ended factors discussed in Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987). A concurring opinion questioned the utility of that list, see 835 F.2d at 1539–43, but we need not decide whether to take a fresh look at the subject. Lauritzen designed its list to help courts choose be‐ tween characterizing migrant laborers as employees or as independent contractors. The agricultural laborers per‐ formed their tasks on Lauritzen’s cucumber farm. When one person compensates another for work done on his property, the statutory phrase “suffer or permit to work” implies the existence of an employment relation, even when the workers set their own schedules and choose their own harvesting techniques. Callahan may have driven on the City’s streets, but Chicago did not “suffer or permit” her to be there; the State of Illinois sets the requirements for drivers’ and chauffeurs’ licenses. Callahan’s suit does not require a choice be‐ tween employment and independent‐contractor status. The core question is whether extensive regulation makes the government an employer of the regulated parties. Our answer to that question is “no.””

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Easton Henry

Case No.: 14-3810

Officials: WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and POSNER, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Sentencing

Conditions of supervised release where probation officer would have home visits deemed unreasonable.

“There is also a question of what the probation officer would hope to learn from home visits that he would not learn from the defendant’s required visits to the probation office. A defendant who has contraband in his home is un- likely to leave it in the “plain view” of the visiting probation officer. But in any event the home-visit condition is not mandatory, and being optional can be modified by the district judge to fit the particulars of the case.”

Judgment vacated and remanded for full resentencing

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Lenard Dixon & William Bell

Case No.: 14-3462; 14-3470

Officials: KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges and BRUCE, District Judge.

Focus: Sufficiency of Evidence

Appellants contend insufficiency of evidence to established premeditated murder and accessory after the fact. Convictions affirmed.

“Having reviewed the trial record, we are satisfied that the jury could reasonably find that Bell both had time to contemplate killing Pendelton and did, in fact, deliberate on the murder before he actually killed Pendelton. The circumstances suggest that Bell left his cell with a plan already in place to kill his fellow prisoner. First, Bell walked out of his cell with something in his hand, and when he arrived at Pendelton’s cell, he used his other hand to open the cell door. One could reasonably surmise from what occurred next, and from the sharpened rod that Dixon subsequently left in the trash can, that Bell had a weapon in his hand, and so was walking to Pendelton’s cell prepared to engage in violence. See Begay, 673 F.3d at 1044 (“Carrying the murder weapon to the scene is strong evidence of premeditation.”) (collecting cases). Second, Bell was in Pendelton’s cell for only a relatively brief period, and there were no real signs of a struggle left either in the cell or on Bell’s person. Although there was blood everywhere in the cell, which is not surprising given the nature of Pendelton’s injuries, nothing in his cell was knocked over or obviously out of place. This suggests that Bell did not stab Pendelton in the heat of an argument, for example, but rather that he entered the cell with a plan to kill Pendelton and executed his design quickly and efficiently. Cf. United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431, 432‐33 (7th Cir. 1972) (testimony that defendant prisoner left his position behind steam table in dining room serving line, walked to center of room where victim was sitting, and attacked him from behind, seizing him around the neck and stabbing him in the back, was sufficient to support finding of premeditation). Third, the actions of both Bell and Dixon appear to have been coordinated, as evidenced by the way in which Dixon left their cell shortly after Bell did, took up post in a chair outside the cell while Bell was inside of Pendelton’s cell, preceded Bell back into their cell as Bell returned, left the cell again a short time later with the bundle of clothes, and ultimately disposed of the clothing and weapon in the day room trash can. Fourth, both Bell and Dixon appeared to take these actions in a calm, unhurried, and deliberate manner, which is somewhat inconsistent with the possibility that Pendelton’s murder was an unexpected or unplanned crime.”

Affirmed

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Gregario Paniagua-Garcia

Case No.: 15-2540

Officials: POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Motion to Suppress – 4^th Amendment

Appellant pulled over for allegedly “texting and driving” challenges sufficiency of search leading to discovery of 5 pounds of heroin. Indiana statute prohibits texting and sending emails while driving and not the many other uses. As a result, state failed to establish officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to pull over appellant.

“The government appears to recognize no limit to the grounds on which police may stop a driver. It says the officer’s suspicion must be reasonable but offers no example of unreasonable suspicion and cites no evidence to support a finding of reasonable suspicion in this case. What it calls reasonable suspicion we call suspicion. Suppose the officer had observed Paniagua drinking from a cup that appeared to contain just coffee. Were the coffee spiked with liquor in however small a quantity, Paniagua would be violating a state law forbidding drinking an alcoholic beverage while driving, and that possibility, however remote, would on the reasoning advanced by the government and adopted by the district judge justify stopping the driver.”

Reversed and Remanded

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: Bathusi Musa v. Loretta E. Lynch

Case No.: 15-2046

Officials: BAUER, POSNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Immigration – Application for Asylum

Foreign national request for asylum not granted where fear of facing genital mutilation upon return to native Botswana

“Although we vacate and remand the decision regarding withholding of removal, we agree with the Board that Musa is not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture. The implementing regulations define torture as “severe pain or suffering … inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8C.F.R. §208.18. Female genital mutilation is torture, of course. But the judge did not err by finding that Musa failed to show that torture is likely to be carried out by or with the acquiescence of the government in Botswana. See Khan v. Holder, 766 F.3d 689, 698 (7th Cir. 2014); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 718 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). The judge justifiably discounted Selawe’s testimony and was unswayed by Musa’s, and Musa has not pointed to evidence in the record to substantiate her testimony that the government would have permitted her family to subject her to FGM even if she had reported their attempts in 2002 and 2003.”

Petition for Asylum Dismissed

Petition for protection under Convention Against Torture Denied

Petition for Withholding of Removal Granted

Full Text

7^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Case Name: United States of America v. Lon Campbell

Case No.: 15-1188

Officials: POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Focus: Conditions of Supervised Release

Appeal dismissed due to appellant waiver.

“When a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights, including a right to challenge a sentence not yet imposed, and the terms of the waiver are express and unambiguous, we will enforce the waiver. United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010). An enforceable waiver prevents challenges to the conditions of supervised re- lease imposed as part of the sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002). The waiver also generally bars review of constitutional errors, see United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014), or errors that are plain in retrospect. Smith, 759 F.3d at 707. Campbell’s waiver was clear and broad and by its terms forecloses this appeal.”

Appeal Dismissed

Full Text