By: Derek Hawkins//September 8, 2015//
Criminal
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Officials: POSNER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges
Sufficiency of Evidence – Prosecutorial Misconduct
No. 14-1701 United States of America v. Eugene Mullins
Evidence of “quid pro quo” not necessary to establish evidence of bribery. Prosecutor misstatement that was promptly objected to, and cured by presiding judge did not prejudice appellant.
“Mullins also contends that he cannot be convicted of bribery because the government produced no evidence of quid pro quo, such as the vendors receiving something in return for the bribe. But they did receive something—their contracts. In any case, evidence of quid pro quo is not necessary to establish a violation of § 666(a)(1)(B). See United States v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, the bribery counts are intact
“Looking at the record as a whole, we are confident that the misstatement did not prejudice Mullins. First, the defense immediately objected to the prosecutor’s misstatement. Second, the judge promptly issued a curative instruction, reminding the jurors that their recollection of the evidence controlled. Third, the prosecutor later altered the statement, correctly telling the jury that Crawford had testified that it was sound practice for Cook County to pay vendors after the vendors completed work. Fourth, this misstatement came against the backdrop of the abundant evidence showing that Mullins solicited bribes for contracts and fraudulently altered vendors’ proposals and invoices through email to avoid detection. Thus, this one minor misstatement did not infect the trial with unfairness such that a new trial is necessary. See United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2011) (upholding decision not to grant new trial when single misstatement, which was immediately corrected, was given by the prosecution during opening statement); United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that improper remarks at trial when combined with a curative jury instruction did not affect trial fairness).”
Affirmed.