Case Digests — March 3-7, 2014

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Wisconsin Law Journal Case Digests, March 3-7, 2014

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Civil
Civil Procedure — notice pleading

Even though a property owner was required to appeal both of the two special assessments against him, the complaint provided sufficient notice that it was appealing both.

“We agree with CED’s first argument and hold that its original complaint was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment, but the Jackson Street special assessment as well. Wisconsin has long abandoned rigid pleading requirements in favor of liberal civil procedural rules. Notice pleading rules not only simplify pleading in Wisconsin, but also favor the resolution of claims on the merits. CED filed its original complaint within the 90-day time period required by Wis. Stat. §66.0703(12)(a). The original complaint included the parcel number, 15-1898-1000, which is the only parcel number assigned to the property in question. Furthermore, the original complaint included reference to the ‘Jackson Street – Murdock Avenue intersection improvement project,’ which formed the basis for the special assessments levied by the City.”

Reversed and Remanded.

2012AP5 CED Properties LLC v. City of Oshkosh

Crooks, J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Olsen, Erik Samuel, Madison; For Respondent: Carlson, Richard J., Appleton

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Criminal
Criminal Procedure – plea withdrawal — prejudice

Where the state would no longer be able to present recorded interviews of the victim at trial, because of the victim’s current age, the state would be prejudiced by permitting the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea.

“The State contends that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas. The State argues that, because the victim is now over 16 years of age, allowing Lopez to withdraw her pleas would prevent it from presenting important audiovisual interviews of the victim at trial. The State asserts that the circuit court was correct to conclude that the State would be substantially prejudiced because, without the audiovisual evidence, it would be more difficult for the State to prove its case, the victim’s memory had faded during the pendency of the action, and it was in the best interests of the victim not to be forced to testify.”

“We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it determined that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas.”

Reversed.

2011AP2733-CR State v. Lopez

Ziegler, J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: FitzGerald, Patricia A., Mt. Horeb; For Respondent: Stephan, Corey C., Madison; O’Neil, Aaron R., Madison

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Civil
Prisons — prison discipline

Melvin Boone appeals a circuit court order affirming a prison discipline decision. We conclude the evidence for the charge was insufficient, and therefore we reverse. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP354 State ex rel. Boone v. Champagne et al.

Dist IV, Dane County, Sumi, J., Per Curiam

Attorneys: For Appellant: Boone, Melvin L., pro se; For Respondent: Potter, Kevin C., Madison; Keckhaver, Karla Z., Madison

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Civil
Insurance — CGL policies — D&O endorsements

In these consolidated appeals, the individual unit owners of the Landing Condominiums of Waukesha claim that the condominium association’s directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties. The directors sought bankruptcy protection and were dismissed from the lawsuit. The issue is whether a directors and officers (D&O) endorsement to a commercial general liability (CGL) policy State Auto Insurance Company issued to the Association still provides coverage for the claims against the directors. The circuit court concluded that the directors’ dismissals effectively discharged their liability, declared that State Auto had no duty to defend or indemnify any of the parties and dismissed all claims against it. The owners appeal on the basis that, under the D&O endorsement, an insured’s bankruptcy does not relieve State Auto of its obligations. We agree and reverse. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP888, 2013AP1538 Hollingsworth et al. v. Landing Condominiums of Waukesha Association Inc. et al.

Dist II, Waukesha County, Dreyfus, J., Per Curiam

Attorneys: For Appellant: Abruzzo, Joseph A., Milwaukee; For Respondent: Mayer, John F., Manitowoc; Wallace, Justin F., Manitowoc

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Motor Vehicles – OWI – arrest — transportation

The State of Wisconsin appeals an order of the circuit court granting Michael Adrian’s motion to suppress evidence, which was granted on the basis that the evidence was obtained following an unlawful arrest. The State contends that the transportation of Adrian to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest. I agree and therefore reverse. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP1890-CR State v. Adrian

Dist IV, Rock County, Werner, J., Sherman, J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Weber, Gregory M., Madison; Jahnke, Mark M., Janesville; For Respondent: Chirafisi, Corey C., Madison

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Motor Vehicles – OWI — reasonable suspicion

Kenneth Roy appeals a judgment convicting him of a fourth offense within a five-year period of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI-4th). The sole issue on appeal is whether the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Roy’s vehicle. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the stop satisfied constitutional standards, and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP1686-CR State v. Roy

Dist IV, Jefferson County, Koschnick, J., Per Curiam

Attorneys: For Appellant: Fischer, Joseph F., Watertown; For Respondent: Weber, Gregory M., Madison; Hall, Monica J., Jefferson

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Motor Vehicles – OWI — speedy trial

Brian Beahm appeals the circuit court’s judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as a second offense. Beahm asserts that the State violated his right to a speedy trial. Although the State concedes that the approximately twelve- to thirteen-month delay in this case was the State’s fault, I affirm because Beahm’s arguments do not persuade me that any of the other right-to-speedy-trial factors weigh significantly in his favor. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP1678-CR State v. Beahm

Dist IV, Marquette County, Wright, J., Lundsten, J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Johnson, Erik C., Montello; For Respondent: Weber, Gregory M., Madison; Hendee, Chad A., Montello

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Motor Vehicles — implied consent — reasonable suspicion

Randy Tomaw appeals a circuit court order determining that Tomaw improperly refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law and revoking Tomaw’s operating privileges based on his refusal. Tomaw’s sole argument on appeal is that his license should not have been revoked for refusing to submit to an evidentiary chemical test of his breath because the investigating police sergeant lacked reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests and, thus, Tomaw’s subsequent arrest was unlawful. I conclude that the sergeant had the requisite level of reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests and that Tomaw was lawfully arrested. Accordingly, I affirm the decision of the circuit court revoking Tomaw’s operating privileges. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP1510 In the matter of the refusal of Randy S. Tomaw

Dist IV, Marquette County, Wright, J., Blanchard, P.J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Jensen, Jeffrey W., Milwaukee; For Respondent: Hendee, Chad A., Montello

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Motor Vehicles – OWI — prosecutorial overreach — mistrials

The State of Wisconsin appeals a judgment of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice the State’s action against Nancy Wall. The court dismissed with prejudice on the basis that the prosecutor had engaged in prosecutorial overreaching during the prosecutor’s opening statement. Under the applicable test, we need not resolve whether the record supports the circuit court’s view that the prosecutor intentionally violated a pretrial order because we conclude the record does not support a finding that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial in order to harass Wall or prompt a new trial at a future date. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of dismissal. Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

2013AP787-CR State v. Wall

Dist IV, La Crosse County, Levine, J., Sherman, J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Gruenke, Tim, La Crosse; Sanders, Michael C., Madison; Xiong, Amesia Ngialah, La Crosse; For Respondent: Moses, Faun M., Madison

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Sentencing – fines — ability to pay

Daniel T. Storm, p/k/a Daniel T. Slaughter, appeals an order denying his motion to vacate the fine portion of his sentence. He contends that there has never been an assessment of his ability to pay the fine as ordered by this court in a previous opinion and, as such, the State has waived its right to have that hearing now, by virtue of extreme delay. He contends, in the alternative, that the circuit court must first conduct an “ability to pay” hearing before there can be enforcement of the fine. He also argues that, to the extent that the record shows a stipulated payment plan, he was never a party to it and never authorized an attorney to so stipulate. But the circuit court found that it “has made several determinations that the Defendant has the ability to pay” and that Storm has stipulated to payment plans in the past. Because Storm has submitted no transcripts to show otherwise, this court must assume that the missing material supports the trial court’s ruling. This court affirms. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP2212 State v. Storm

Dist II, Racine County, Torhorst, J., Brown, C.J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Storm, Daniel T., pro se; For Respondent: Newlun, James D., Racine; Weber, Gregory M., Madison

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Probation and Parole — revocation

Thomas Domina appeals from a circuit court order denying his petition for a writ of certiorari contesting the revocation of his probation. He challenges as unreasonable the Division of Hearings and Appeals’ determination that Domina violated his supervision rules by failing to disclose to his agent his incidental contact with a minor child in a restaurant bathroom.

We conclude that the revocation decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. We affirm. This opinion will not be published.

2013AP487 State ex rel. Domina v. Wiedenhoeft

Dist II, Waukesha County, Weston, J., Per Curiam

Attorneys: For Appellant: Velasquez, Michelle L., Madison; For Respondent: Kilpatrick, Steven C., Madison

Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Criminal
Sentencing — ineffective assistance — accurate information

Joelle Borowitz appeals a judgment, entered upon her no contest pleas, convicting her of first-degree reckless injury with use of a dangerous weapon, and felony intimidation of a witness, both counts as party to a crime. Borowitz also challenges the order denying her postconviction motion for resentencing. Borowitz claims: (1) the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion; (2) she was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing; and (3) she was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order. This opinion will not be published.

2012AP2660-CR State v. Borowitz

Dist III, Shawano County, Habeck, J., Per Curiam

Attorneys: For Appellant: Hunt, Edward J., Milwaukee; For Respondent: Parker, Gregory A., Shawano; Larson, Sara Lynn, Madison

U.S. Supreme Court

Civil
Securities — whistleblower protection

The term “an employee” in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a) is not limited to employees of public companies.

The Court looks first to the ordinary meaning of the provision’s language. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108. As relevant here, §1514A(a) provides that “no . . . contractor . . . may discharge . . . an employee.” The ordinary meaning of “an employee” in this proscription is the contractor’s own employee. FMR’s “narrower construction” requires inserting “of a public company” after “an employee,” but where Congress meant “an employee of a public company,” it said so.

The provision as a whole supports this reading. The prohibited retaliatory measures enumerated in §1514A(a) — discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, harassment, or discrimination in employment terms and conditions — are actions an employer takes against its own employees. Contractors are not ordinarily positioned to take adverse actions against employees of the public company with whom they contract. FMR’s interpretation of §1514A, therefore, would shrink to insignificance the provision’s ban on retaliation by contractors. The protected activity covered by §1514A, and the provision’s enforcement procedures and remedies, also indicate that Congress presumed an employer-employee relationship between the retaliator and the whistleblowing employee.

670 F.3d 61, reversed and remanded.

12-3 Lawson v. FMR LLC

Ginsburg, J.; Scalia, J., concurring; Sotomayor, J., dissenting.

U.S. Supreme Court

Civil
Bankruptcy — attorney fees

The Bankruptcy Court exceeded the limits of its authority when it ordered that the $75,000 protected by a debtor’s homestead exemption be made available to pay the trustee’s attorney’s fees.

A bankruptcy court may not exercise its authority to “carry out” the provisions of the Code, 11 U. S. C. §105(a), or its “inherent power . . . to sanction ‘abusive litigation practices,’ ” Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U. S. 365, 375–376, by taking action prohibited elsewhere in the Code. Here, the Bankruptcy Court’s “surcharge” contravened §522, which (by reference to California law) entitled Law to exempt $75,000 of equity in his home from the bankruptcy estate,§522(b)(3)(A), and which made that $75,000 “not liable for payment of any administrative expense,” §522(k), including attorney’s fees, see §503(b)(2). The surcharge thus exceeded the limits of both the court’s authority under §105(a) and its inherent powers.

435 Fed. Appx. 697, reversed and remanded.

12-5196 Law v. Siegel

Scalia, J.

U.S. Supreme Court
Criminal

Firearms — carrying a firearm in connection with a drug crime

The Government establishes that a defendant aided and abetted an 18 U.S.C. 924(c) violation by proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.

In addition to conduct extending to some part of the crime, aiding and abetting requires intent extending to the whole crime. The defendant must not just associate himself with the venture, but also participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about and seek by his actions to make it succeed. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 619. That requirement is satisfied when a person actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U. S. 1, 12. An active participant in a drug transaction has the intent needed to aid and abet a §924(c) violation when he knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun. This must be advance knowledge — meaning, knowledge at a time when the accomplice has a reasonable opportunity to walk away.

695 F. 3d 1151, vacated and remanded.

12-895 Rosemond v. U.S.

Kagan, J.; Alito, J., dissenting in part.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Civil
Civil Rights — due process — excessive force — jury instructions

In a claim of excessive force against a pretrial detainee, the district court did not err by instructing the jury regarding the defendants’ subjective intent.

“Our dissenting colleague believes that our cases have been ambiguous on the question of intent, but we see no serious ambiguity here. Our cases make clear that, although we employ the objective criteria of the Fourth Amendment as a touchstone by which to measure the gravity of the defendant officer’s conduct, we also recognize, quite clearly, the need for a subjective inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind in performing the activity under scrutiny. In determining whether the defendant officer had the requisite state of mind — at least recklessness — the same criteria used to measure the defendant’s lack of care are a useful benchmark. This is because, as Titran intimated, the gravity of the offense and the requisite intent are closely linked. Titran is clear that the strength of this link under a particular set of facts may mean that the inference of intent is so strong that no further inquiry need be made. See Titran, 893 F.2d at 148 (‘If the officers intentionally restrained, jolted, and roughed up Titran without physical provocation from her, their behavior was unreasonable.’). But when the inference is less strong, the cases do make clear that some examination of intent is appropriate, and that the distinction makes a mechanical application of Fourth Amendment objective standards impossible. See id. at 147 (‘Subtle differences between Fourth and [Fourteenth] Amendment standards are inevitable on account of this mental element.’ (emphasis added)).”

Affirmed.

12-3639 Kingsley v. Hendrickson

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Crabb, J., Ripple, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Civil
Immigration – asylum — Columbia

Even though the Columbian government is at war with FARC, a property owner may be entitled to asylum after her relatives were kidnapped.

“[T]he Board concluded that N.L.A. could safely relocate in Colombia just as her sister had. The Board stated, ‘Although the respondent’s sister and her family apparently move and change their phone numbers often, and have registered their pharmacy under a third party’s name, the sister and her family routinely leave their home to work and attend school.’ (R. 8). This is quite an extensive ‘although.’ One need not be secreted in an attic behind a hidden bookcase to be living in hiding. As we explained above, moving frequently, changing phone numbers and living under an assumed identity is a horrible way to live and certainly constitutes living in hiding. It is an error of law to assume that an applicant cannot be entitled to asylum if she has demonstrated the ability to escape persecution only by chance or by trying to remain undetected. Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 555 (7th Cir. 2006). N.L.A.’s sister has not demonstrated that she has safely relocated. The Board’s conclusion that N.L.A. could indeed relocate, which is based on what the Board views as her sister’s success, is not reasoned or logical.”

Petition Granted.

11-2706 N.L.A. v. Holder

Petition for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Rovner, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Search and Seizure — GPS devices — exclusionary rule

The exclusionary rule does not apply to GPS searches prior to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in U.S. v. Jones (2012).

“Jones did not hold — though five Justices suggested in concurring opinions — that monitoring a car’s location for an extended time is a search even if the car’s owner consents to installation of the GPS unit, so that no property rights have been invaded. 132 S. Ct. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). An extension of Jones along the concurring opinions’ lines is essential to Brown’s position, since this GPS unit was installed without a trespass. A Jeep’s owner decided to cooperate with the police in their investigation of his confederates and authorized the attachment of a tracker. The police thought that this step is as permissible as asking their informant to wear a concealed recording or broadcasting device; Brown, by contrast, maintains that monitoring a GPS locator requires probable cause and a warrant even if monitoring an informant’s wire does not. We bypass that question, as well as other issues such as whether a person using someone else’s car (or that person’s co-conspirator) can protest the use of evidence derived from a device that shows no more than the car’s location. No matter how these substantive issues come out, it would be inappropriate to use the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence derived from this GPS locator before the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. Until then, precedent would have led reasonable officers to believe that using GPS to track a car’s location was not a search.”

Affirmed.

11-1565 U.S. v. Brown

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Clevert, J., Easterbrook, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Firearms – FIPOF — interstate commerce

The government sufficiently proved a firearm was shipped or transported in interstate commerce via testimony from an ATF agent without personal knowledge of the gun’s manufacture.

“The agent not only works in Indiana, but her job involves determining the state in which a gun is manufactured (or in which it is not manufactured — because, to repeat, it doesn’t matter where the defendant’s gun was manufactured so long as it was not manufactured in the state in which he possessed it). The manager of Tri Town Plastics’ plant has a different job, the performance of which would be disrupted if he had to fly to remote locations any time a person was being prosecuted as a felon in possession of a gun believed to have been manufactured in that plant. It’s no surprise that the use of expert testimony to prove that a gun has crossed state lines is the standard method of proof of that element of the crime of being a felon in possession — evidence accepted as valid by (so far as we have been able to determine) all courts. See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 914 F.2d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 92 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Carter, 270 F.3d 731, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2001).”

Affirmed.

13-2745 U.S. v. Brownlee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Miller, J., Posner, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Habeas Corpus — plea offers

Where there is conflicting evidence whether the state ever offered a defendant a plea agreement, it was not unreasonable to find that no offer was made.

“We do not mean to suggest that the district court came to the only possible conclusion on these facts. There is enough evidence in the record that a fact-finder could have come out either way. But whether we agree with the district court’s factual conclusion is not the question. There was conflicting evidence and the district court had to make a finding; it did so, and its finding is not clearly erroneous.”

Affirmed.

12-3006 Kerr v. Dittmann

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Clevert, J., Wood, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Criminal Procedure — Ex Post Facto Clause — competency

Where the district court used a sentencing guideline not in effect at the time of the crime, the sentence must be vacated.

“On appeal, Woodard argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a second competency evaluation. Because the district court reached a reasonable conclusion after it reviewed a previous psychological evaluation, considered the advice of two mental health professionals, and considered Woodard’s interactions with her attorney, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. In addition, although Woodard argues that she did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty during her Rule 11 colloquy, a review of the record shows that she did and that no red flags were raised that would alert the court to the contrary. Finally, we agree with her last argument that the district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause at sentencing by sentencing her under the wrong version of the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, we remand this case for resentencing, but affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects.”

Affirmed in part, and Vacated in part.

12-3363 U.S. v. Woodard

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, McKinney, J., Williams, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Sentencing — reasonableness

Where the district court did not address the argument of a child pornography defendant that he should receive leniency because he had no history of actual sexual contact with children, the sentence must be vacated.

“It is undeniable that Poulin received a below-range sentence, but that does not mean the district judge adequately considered and took into account Poulin’s argument that the overall calculation was excessive here. First, this is not a situation where a judge failed to address an argument that was ‘so weak as not to merit discussion.’ See United States v. Cunnigham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (‘A judge who fails to mention a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a factual basis) is likely to have committed an error or oversight.’). We previously held that Poulin’s argument — ‘that the child-pornography guidelines do not approximate the goals of sentencing when applied to defendants convicted only of possession who have no history of contact offenses’ — is a valid argument that a sentencing judge must address. United States v. Martin, 718 F.3d 684, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2013). The judge was thus required to con? sider it, and then provide reasons explaining his acceptance or rejection of it. He did not do that here. Cf. United States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2010).”

Vacated and Remanded.

13-1592 U.S. v. Poulin

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Mihm, J., Durkin, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Criminal Procedure — juror bias

The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider statements made by the defendant’s jurors in subsequent proceedings concerning their deliberative process.

“The juror statements in this case concern only ‘intrajury influences on the verdict during the deliberative process,’ Ford, 840 F.2d at 465, and therefore fall squarely within the Rule 606(b)(1) prohibition. They are not admissible under existing law. Torres-Chavez acknowledges the legal status quo, but argues that we should create an additional, judge-made exception to the 606(b)(1) prohibition for statements concerning potential bias against a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent, as the First Circuit has done for statements exhibiting racial or ethnic bias. See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 84–88 (1st Cir. 2009). We decline to do so, and we thus join every other circuit court to consider the issue. See United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d 817, 832 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Tran, 122 F.3d 670, 672–73 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martinez-Moncivais, 14 F.3d 1030, 1036–37 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 927–28 (3d Cir. 1981).”

“Rule 606(b)(2) already lists the circumstances under which evidence of juror statements should be admitted. Expanding that list by carving out additional prudential exceptions vitiates the rule and threatens the values that undergird it. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, ‘full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct.’ Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120–21. We are not prepared to say that no circumstances exist which would warrant a prudential exception, but we join our sister circuits in concluding that these circumstances do not.”

Affirmed.

13-1340 U.S. v. Torres-Chavez

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, St. Eve, J., Kanne, J.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Criminal
Criminal Procedure — involuntary medication

Where the district court deferred to the evaluating psychiatrist, the court’s order that a defendant be involuntarily medicated must be vacated.

“When the Government seeks to medicate involuntarily a defendant solely for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial, however, it must meet a higher standard to counterbalance the defendant’s right to avoid involuntary medication. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82. In Sell, the Court set forth four findings that the district court must make before ordering the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial. First, the district court must determine ‘that important governmental interests are at stake’ based on the facts of the individual case. Id. Second, the court must find that the medication ‘is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial’ and ‘is substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense.’ Id. at 181. ‘Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests’ and ‘that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.’ Id. ‘Fourth, … the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.’ Id. The Government must establish each of these conditions by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Lyons, 733 F.3d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2013). “Without a clear statement of the court’s rationale … , we cannot evaluate whether [the court’s] decision was proper or constituted clear error.” United States v. Hawk, 434 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 2006).”

Vacated and Remanded.

13-3281 U.S. v. Debenedetto

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Castillo, J., Ripple, J.