United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Immigration — asylum
To obtain asylum, a petitioner must show specific facts showing that he will be singled out for persecution if removed.
“Though we often discuss a petitioner’s membership in a particular group in the context of assessing an individualized threat of future persecution, see Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 2011), we have never held that a petitioner may put forth less evidence of individualized persecution simply by virtue of belonging to a disfavored group. See, e.g., Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder, 635 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying petition for review where evidence of country conditions regarding Chinese repression of Christianity were ‘untethered from facts establishing an individualized risk of persecution’). Instead, we have always required a petitioner to show ‘specific, detailed facts supporting the reasonableness of [his] fear that [he] will be singled out for persecution.’ Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing cases). In reality, the disfavored group approach in the Ninth Circuit may yield similar or even identical results. See, e.g., Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying petition for review where petitioner failed to make the ‘minimal showing’ of individual targeting). But to the extent that the Ninth Circuit uses ‘a lower standard for individualized fear absent a “pattern or practice” of persecution,’ Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 538 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005), we must join other circuits that have rejected the disfavored group approach. See id.; Kho, 505 F.3d at 55; Wijaya v. Gonzales, 227 Fed. Appx. 35, 38 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order). Here too, Salim presented no new evidence on reopening to show his individualized risk of future persecution, and, therefore, the disfavored group approach would not have helped him in any event.”
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Williams, J.