United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Criminal Procedure — collateral estoppel — speedy trials
Where the government did not oppose a motion to suppress evidence in a prior proceeding, collateral estoppel does not apply.
“The government had not opposed the motion not because it conceded that the agents had elicited statements from the defendant after he asked for a lawyer, but rather, so far as appears, because it wasn’t (at the time) interested in using the statements at trial. So naturally the judge granted the motion. That was a judicial action, but it was not the resolution of a dispute (namely over whether Loera had asked for a lawyer before answering the agents’ questions). See United States v. Bruce, 109 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1997); Truck Ins. Exchange v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1992). And finally the grant of the motion to suppress had played no role in the dismissal of the first indictment. The only ground for that dismissal had been violation of the Speedy Trial Act, a ground to which the motion was irrelevant.”
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Simon, J., Posner, J.