United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Sentencing — ex post facto clause
It does not apply the ex post facto clause to apply U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12), which enhances the sentence for a defendant who “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” even though the offense occurred before the guideline was enacted.
“In United States v. Demaree, we held that amendments to advisory sentencing guidelines do not implicate the ex post facto clause, even if the amendments were passed after the defendant committed the offense. 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). Sanchez spent a significant portion of his brief discussing how other circuits have reached a different conclusion, but, as we have said before, we ‘respectfully disagree’ with our sister circuits on this issue. United States v. Robertson, 662 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2011). For that reason, we have consistently rejected Sanchez’s familiar argument. See, e.g., United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 951 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2012); Robertson, 662 F.3d at 876 (collecting cases).”
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Norgle, J., Kanne, J.