Civil Rights — Absolute immunity

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Civil Rights — Absolute immunity

Even though an administrator was appointed by a judge, he does not have absolute immunity from a claim that he violated an employee’s First Amendment rights by terminating him.

“Dunlap asserts that receivers are protected by absolute immunity as long as they act within the scope of the order creating the receivership, and he maintains that he is entitled to the same protection because the Juvenile Detention Center is essentially under receivership. See, e.g., Property Management & Investments, Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599 (11th Cir. 1985). All but one of the cases he relies on for this proposition—New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1989)—predate Forrester. New Alaska Development arguably adopted
Dunlap’s reading of Forrester, see 869 F.2d at 1303 n.6, though the ninth circuit has limited New Alaska to situations in which an owner contests the very appointment of a receiver. See Medical Development International v. California Department of Corrections, 585 F.3d 1211, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). Some cases after Forrester have stated that receivers are protected by absolute immunity without dealing with the distinction between adjudication and administration. One such case, Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1995), did not cite Forrester. See also In re Cedar Funding, Inc., 419 B.R. 807, 823 (9th Cir. BAP 2009); Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994); Teton Millwork Sales v. Schlossberg, 311 Fed. App’x 145, 150 (10th Cir. 2009). Forrester tells us that Dunlap’s administrative acts are not protected by absolute immunity even though Dunlap was acting within the scope of his authority. Accord, Medical Development International, 585 F.3d at 1119–22.

Affirmed.

11-2669 Coleman v. Dunlap

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Holderman, J., Easterbrook, J.

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