Criminal Procedure — juror bias

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Wisconsin Supreme Court

Criminal

Criminal Procedure — juror bias

Where the defendant exercised a peremptory strike to remove the circuit court judge’s daughter-in-law from the jury, and the defendant does not claim the jury was unfair or partial, a new trial is not required.

“The defendant does not claim that the jury was biased, unfair, or partial. Nor does the defendant claim that she falls within any of the situations set forth in Lindell that might justify a new trial even when a defendant receives a fair and impartial jury. There is no evidence in the record that defense counsel was stifled in questioning other prospective jurors as a result of his experience with the challenged juror; that defense counsel was forced to exhaust all of the peremptory challenges without conducting adequate voir dire; or that the circuit court acted in bad faith.”

“In sum, the defendant exercised her peremptory right to remove the judge’s daughter-in-law from the jury. The defendant agrees that she was tried by a fair, impartial jury. The defendant has not demonstrated harm. Thus, we hold that the defendant’s substantial rights were not impaired. The Lindell case governs the instant case. The defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that the circuit court erred in failing to excuse the juror sua sponte for cause.”

Reversed and Remanded.

2010AP445-CR State v. Sellhausen

Abrahamson, C.J.

Attorneys: For Appellant: Lichstein, Byron C., Madison; For Respondent: Kassel, Jeffrey J., Madison; DeCecco, Joseph R., Sheboygan