Sentencing — extraordinary rehabilitation

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United States Court of Appeals
Criminal
Sentencing — extraordinary rehabilitation
Where the defendants were not charged until the day before expiration of the ten-year statute of limitations, and they had engaged in significant rehabilitation during the intervening period, the district court erred in not considering that.
“In the Robertsons’ case, the government did not charge the defendants with their crimes until nearly ten years had passed. By the time they were sentenced, it was nearly twelve years after the fact. Those delays were not contrary to law, but they meant in the Robertsons’ case that the relevant sentencing factors looked much different than they might have a decade earlier. At their sentencing in 2011, they presented unusually strong evidence of their self-motivated efforts to rehabilitate themselves. Apart from Henry’s conviction for reckless driving in 2002, both Henry and Elizabeth had refrained from committing any other criminal offenses. Each maintained full-time, gainful employment. Elizabeth had overcome a particularly traumatic childhood to become a pediatric intensive care nurse and was, at the time of sentencing, on the brink of retirement after three decades of service. Henry worked as a cable installer and technician. They had raised three children, seeing two through college and into graduate school and seeing the third serve in the military. Henry had taken an active role in preventing crime in his neighborhood as president of its block club, and both Henry and Elizabeth volunteered as youth sports coaches. The Robertsons were compliant with pretrial supervision. Even the government acknowledged that, over a ‘relatively significant amount of time,’ the Robertsons had ‘demonstrate[d] to the Court, to society, that they can stay out of trouble.’”
“In short, the Robertsons’ principal argument at sentencing was that they had rehabilitated themselves of their own accord. Our review of the record persuades us that the sentencing court failed to address this evidence in that context. Concerning the Robertsons’ criminal histories, the court acknowledged that Henry had not committed any crimes since 2002 and that Elizabeth lacked any criminal history. But other than noting, without further detail or explanation, that Elizabeth had provided ‘excellent service . . . as a professional in the medical field,’ it is not apparent that the sentencing court considered the Robertson’s unusually strong evidence of self-motivated rehabilitation over the past ten years. Because the court’s silence makes it impossible to discern that it appropriately balanced the Robertsons’ rehabilitated lives and characters against the seriousness of their offense for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we find this minimal treatment to be insufficient.”
Vacated and Remanded.
11-1651 & 11-1618 U.S. v. Robertson
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Lindberg, J., Hamilton, J.