11-1205 U.S. v. Richardson

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Criminal Procedure
Miranda warnings

Statements need not be suppressed, despite the absence of Miranda warnings, where they were given not in response to interrogation, but because the defendant hoped he could get leniency in exchange for cooperation.

“Richardson claims the entire conversation he had with Sergeant Shortt was functionally equivalent to a custodial interrogation, thus triggering Miranda’s warning requirement. An officer can ‘interrogate’ a suspect for Miranda purposes without uttering a question. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). A custodial conversation is an interrogation when the officer knows or should know that his ‘words or actions . . . are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’ Id. at 301.”

“But ‘the police are not prohibited from “merely listening” to [a suspect’s] voluntary statement.’ United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)). And that is precisely what Sergeant Shortt did—with the exception of an isolated question, the response to which was correctly suppressed. He traveled to the scene of Richardson’s arrest only because Richardson wanted to speak with someone who might help him ‘make this go away.’ Sergeant Shortt did not violate Miranda by obliging Richardson’s desire to talk, and the district court did not err by admitting Richardson’s statements to Sergeant Shortt.”

Affirmed.

11-1205 U.S. v. Richardson

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, DeGuilio, J., Kanne, J.

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