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09-2863, 09-2864, 09-3231, 09-3232, 09-3347, 09-3603 & 09-3653 U.S. v. Morales

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//August 18, 2011//

09-2863, 09-2864, 09-3231, 09-3232, 09-3347, 09-3603 & 09-3653 U.S. v. Morales

By: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF//August 18, 2011//

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Criminal Procedure
Anonymous juries

Although it was error for the district court not to state its reasons for empanelling an anonymous jury on the record, the error was harmless where the trial was a multi-defendant prosecution of members of a violent criminal gang.

“On appeal, the Defendants do not convincingly undermine the validity of these points. They argue that the government did not mention any situations where any Deuce had attempted to interfere with jurors and that there was no evidence that juror intimidation was likely. They do not, however, address the allegation that Deuces attempted to murder Rivera after several of them were arrested and learned that he was a cooperating witness. Nor do they acknowledge the resulting, reasonable inference that jurors may be as susceptible as cooperators and witnesses to their gang’s violent acts. See United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (‘[A] general willingness to obstruct justice on the part of a defendant or his associates[ ] is more than adequate to suggest a real possibility that a defendant will threaten or otherwise tamper with jurors.’). While the ability and incentive to threaten jurors alone are not enough to warrant an anonymous jury, Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 651, we conclude that an evidenced history of interference with the administration of justice—added to the gang’s ability and incentive—would bring a case within the district court’s discretion to empanel an anonymous jury, see Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216; Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1091-92; United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991). The anonymous jury jurisprudence of this and other circuits does not require proof of impending harm to jurors; rather, it only requires reason to believe that jury protection is necessary. See, e.g., Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 651 (evidence of accused’s unusually profound pattern of violence could cause jurors to fear for their safety); United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1996) (protection through anonymity appropriate to prevent tampering by organized criminals with history of bribery); Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1091 (history of jury tampering sufficient, but not necessary, to ascertain a threat to jurors from the charges in the indictment).”

Affirmed.

09-2863, 09-2864, 09-3231, 09-3232, 09-3347, 09-3603 & 09-3653 U.S. v. Morales

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Leinenweber, J., Kanne, J.

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