08-728 Bloate v. U.S.

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Criminal Procedure
Speedy trial act

The time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the 70-day limit under 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1). Such time may be excluded only when a district court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7).

The Act does not force a district court to choose between rejecting a defendant's request for time to prepare pretrial motions and risking dismissal of the indictment if preparation time delays the trial. A court may still exclude preparation time under subsection (h)(7) by granting a continuance for that purpose based on recorded findings. Subsection (h)(7) provides "[m]uch of the Act's flexibility," Zedner , 547 U. S., at 498, giving district courts "discretion … to accommodate limited delays for case-specific needs," id. , at 499. The Government suggests that a district court may fail to make the necessary subsection (h)(7) findings, leading to a windfall gain for a defendant who induces delay beyond the 70-day limit. But dismissal need not represent a windfall. If the court dismisses the charges without prejudice , the Government may refile charges or reindict. In ruling on a motion to dismiss under the Act, the district court should consider, inter alia, the party responsible for the delay.

534 F. 3d 893, reversed and remanded.

Local effect: The opinion reverses governing law in the Seventh Circuit, U.S. v. Tibboel, 753 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1985).

08-728 Bloate v. U.S.

Thomas, J.; Ginsburg, J., concurring; Alito, J., dissenting.

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