08-108 Flores-Figueroa v. U.S.

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Aggravated Identity Theft
Sufficiency of evidence

18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(1) requires the Government to show that the defendant knew that the means of identification at issue belonged to another person.

As a matter of ordinary English grammar, "knowingly" is naturally read as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. Where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as "knowingly") that modifies the verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object. The Government does not provide a single example of a sentence that, when used in typical fashion, would lead the hearer to a contrary understanding. And courts ordinarily interpret criminal statutes consistently with the ordinary English usage. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 . The Government argues that this position is incorrect because it would either require the same language to be interpreted differently in a neighboring provision or would render the language in that provision superfluous. This argument fails for two reasons. Finally, the Government's arguments based on the statute's purpose and on the practical problems of enforcing it are not sufficient to overcome the ordinary meaning, in English or through ordinary interpretive practice, of Congress' words.

274 Fed. Appx. 501, reversed and remanded.

Local effect: The Seventh Circuit has not previously considered the issue.

08-108 Flores-Figueroa v. U.S.

Breyer, J.; Scalia, J., concurring in part; Alito, J., concurring in part.

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