Court rules on coerced confession suit

Listen to this article

A person charged with a crime based on her involuntary confession can sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. That’s according to a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision released Jan. 20.

In 2000, the First Midwest Bank in Knoxville, Illinois, was robbed. The perpetrator was described as male, 5’9”, approximately 160 pounds, dark complexion, dark eyes, dark hair, clean-shaven and in his thirties.

Scott Sornberger was questioned as a suspect, even though he was 5’11”, had blond hair, blue eyes, a fair complexion and a mustache. His wife, Teresa, was also questioned. Both said they were at Scott’s parents’ home, using their computer at the time of the robbery.

Scott was later arrested, and Teresa was questioned again (whether she was in custody is a subject of dispute). Under pressure from the police, she confessed to the robbery. Both were charged in state court with bank robbery.

The judge denied Teresa’s motion to suppress her confession, finding that she lied on the stand. Based on the confession, the court found probable cause that they committed the crime.

Ultimately, the police arrested the real perpetrator of the robbery, and the Sornbergers were released. By then, they had been in custody for approximately four months.

The Sornbergers brought suit in federal court against a variety of state actors, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sornbergers appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed in a decision by Judge Kenneth F. Ripple, on several grounds.

First, the court held that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Scott, reasoning, “First, Scott did not match — or even come close to matching — the physical description of the robber that was provided by the only eyewitness who saw the robber’s face. Secondly, Brent Dugin, the bank employee who knew Scott, told the police that, at certain angles of the surveillance footage, the suspect did not resemble Scott. Third, the camera footage itself lacked a clarity of resolution that made it difficult to discern significant detail. The inconclusive nature of this footage, in addition to the differences between the specific description of the bank robber and the actual appearance of Scott Sornberger, undermines substantially the determination of probable cause in this instance.”

The court also noted that the U.S. Attorney, who could have filed charges in federal court for the crime, refused to sanction the arrest. In addition, had the officers searched Scott’s parents’ computer, which their warrant authorized them to do, they could have verified Scott’s alibi. Given the paucity of probable cause, the court further concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Second, the court concluded that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Teresa’s claim that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her.

The only evidence against Teresa was her confession, and the defendants made logically inconsistent assertions on this point. Finding that a factual question precluding summary judgment was present, as to whether Teresa was in custody, the court remarked, “The officers cannot claim, on one hand, that Teresa’s confession was not tainted by a lack of Miranda warnings and then argue,
on the other, that those same Miranda warnings are not evidence that Teresa was considered a suspect. The contradiction creates a triable issue that prevents summary judgment.”

However, the court did affirm the grant of summary judgment to the arresting officers’ supervisors, noting that the evidence showed that the supervisors had emphasized to the subordinate officers that they should request Teresa to come voluntarily and take her to the police station for questioning only if she agreed.

Third, the court reversed the district court’s holding that, because the state court found her confession voluntary at the suppression hearing, therefore, Teresa was collaterally estopped from bringing the Section 1983 claim.

Applying Illinois law, the court held collateral estoppel inapplicable, because, even if all the elements of the doctrine are met, Illinois provides an exception if the party against whom preclusion is sought is unable to appeal the judgment in the initial action.

Citing an Illinois court decision that stressed the limited applicability of collateral estoppel against a criminal defendant, the court quoted, “a defendant, unlike the prosecution, is not allowed an immediate appeal from an adverse ruling upon a motion to suppress. He cannot review that ruling until after he has been convicted and sentenced. And for a variety of reasons he might not wish to appeal, or as in the case of an acquittal at the first trial, he might not be able to do so.” People v. Hopkins, 284 N.E.2d 283, 284 (Ill.1972).

The Seventh Circuit added, “As this language indicates, the concerns that limit application of collateral estoppel in the criminal context arise out of problems of appealability for criminal defendants, rather than the nature of subsequent proceedings.”

The court also relied on equitable considerations, concluding, “In these circumstances, it would be extremely unfair to hold Teresa to the unappealable judgment of a court that used unsound reasoning to resolve credibility. Collateral estoppel therefore cannot bar relitigation of the voluntariness of Teresa’s confession.”

Fourth, the court held that Teresa’s claims were not precluded by Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that coerced statements could not form the basis of a Section 1983 claim, where the compelled statements were never used against the plaintiff in a criminal case (unlike Teresa, Chavez was never even charged).

The court reasoned, “where, as here, a suspect’s criminal prosecution was not only initiated, but was commenced because of her allegedly un-warned confession, the ‘criminal case’ contemplated by the Self-Incrimination Clause has begun. That Teresa’s confession was then introduced as evidence of her guilt at a probable cause hearing, a bail hearing and an arraignment proceeding further persuades us that Teresa was ‘compelled in [a] criminal case to be a witness against [her]self.’ This use of Teresa’s confession, if the confession is indeed found to have been elicited without Miranda warnings, allows a suit for damages under sec. 1983 (emphasis in original)(cites, footnotes omitted).”

	Related Links 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Related Article Case Analysis

Fifth, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Scott and Teresa’s claims that the officers violated due process by generating a police report that falsely described the circumstances surrounding Teresa’s confession, by lying to the state prosecutor about the confession, and by perjuring themselves at the suppression hearing.

The court wrote, “Teresa complains that Officers Sheppard and Riley failed to disclose the circumstances of her interrogation. However, Teresa already was quite familiar with those circumstances. Teresa knew herself what occurred during the interrogation, and the police were under no Brady obligation to tell her again that they coerced her into confessing.”

Finally, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the city, because Teresa presented substantial evidence that the city has a policy of coercing confessions from female suspects by threatening to have family services take away their children.

Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further proceedings, with respect to those claims on which it reversed the court.

Click here for Case Analysis.

David Ziemer can be reached by email.