00-1504 Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., et al.

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“Allsteel’s alteration of the Plan’s language changed the standard of review by which a court would review its decisions, thereby granting Allsteel the same unchanneled discretion to deny claims. Before Allsteel altered the Plan’s language to grant itself discretion to interpret and construe the Plan, its decision would have been subject to de novo review. Section 1.3 of the Plan, as originally drafted, was insufficient to trigger deferential review. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Blank, 225 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2000); Michael Reese Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Solo Cup Employee Hlth. Ben. Plan, 899 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1990). But the language added by Allsteel (‘The Company shall have discretionary authority to interpret and construe this Plan and to determine all questions arising under this Plan, including questions regarding eligibility, vesting and entitlement to benefits under the Plan.’) was sufficient to trigger deferential review and expand the range of options available to Allsteel as administrator. …

“By adding language that granted itself discretionary authority to determine eligibility under and to construe the Plan, Allsteel increased the likelihood that Johnson will, at some point, be denied benefits under the Plan. This correspondingly decreased the certainty of his Plan entitlements, causing him immediate injury. Thus we conclude that Johnson has sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact.”

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Castillo, J., Williams, J.